BB (Guinea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Internal relocation depends on evidence, not speculation. A finding that a claimant cannot safely relocate because family persecutors will discover her whereabouts requires evidence of circumstances making that likely. Unsupported assumptions about the authorities or general population do not suffice. The distinct question whether relocation would be unreasonable because of hardship must be addressed if properly raised below. A claimant cannot introduce that issue for the first time in the Court of Appeal on an appeal confined to an error of law.

The appellant, a young Guinean woman, claimed asylum after fleeing a threatened forced marriage and severe ill-treatment by her father and brother. An immigration judge found that she had a well-founded fear of persecution and that internal relocation was not viable. On reconsideration, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, finding no evidential basis for concluding that the family would trace her elsewhere in Guinea.

Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to address the separate question whether relocation would be unreasonable because of hardship. The central issues were the evidential basis for the family-tracing conclusion and whether the hardship argument had been raised in time.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal considered only the live internal relocation issues. It made clear that the immigration judge’s other findings, although unchallenged, were not thereby endorsed by the court.

1. The appellant’s case was that, as a single woman without resources, she would have to work elsewhere in Guinea, attract public or official attention, and thereby be traced by her family. There was no evidence of special circumstances supporting that chain of events. In particular, there was no basis for concluding that the authorities or members of the public would have any reason to locate and inform the family. The AIT was therefore entitled to reverse the immigration judge’s finding as an error of law.
2. Internal relocation raises a distinct question whether it would be unreasonable to expect the claimant to relocate because of the hardship involved. If the immigration judge had made a separate finding on that issue, the AIT would have needed to address it before reversing the decision.
3. Read as a whole, however, paragraph 35(h) of the immigration judge’s determination treated the vulnerability of an unprotected woman as part of the alleged chain by which her family would discover her whereabouts. It did not make a separate finding that relocation was unreasonable because of hardship.
4. The hardship issue was not raised in the appellant’s application, before the immigration judge, in the application for reconsideration, or before the AIT. It was raised only in the Court of Appeal. The decision in VNM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 47 was distinguishable because the reasonableness issue there had expressly been disputed below. The issue could not be raised for the first time on an appeal limited to an error of law.
5. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s costs were subject to detailed assessment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 31 January 2007, dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the AIT’s decision. [2007] EWCA Civ 129
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: On reconsideration, promulgated its determination on 31 January 2006 and allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, finding a material error of law in the immigration judge’s treatment of internal relocation.
3. Immigration judge: On 5 July 2005, found that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution, granted asylum, and held that removal would breach her Convention rights.