Littlejohn v City of Westminster

Statutory vulnerability is assessed when an applicant is actually homeless. The question is whether a particular condition makes the applicant less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, so that injury or detriment results. Difficulty obtaining or retaining accommodation does not, by itself, establish vulnerability. It must arise from a qualifying condition and produce the required inability to cope with homelessness. The reviewing officer’s assessment will stand where it applies the correct legal test and is reasonably open on the evidence. The guidance in [1998] 31 HLR 317 was applied.

Mr Littlejohn applied to the City of Westminster for housing assistance while homeless or threatened with homelessness. Following an assessment by the Joint Assessment Service, the reviewing housing officer concluded that he was not vulnerable for the purposes of the statutory priority-need test. Mr Littlejohn’s housing history included repeated difficulties in obtaining and maintaining accommodation.

HHJ Behar considered an appeal which was, in substance, a judicial review of the local authority’s decision. Mr Littlejohn sought permission to appeal, arguing that the reviewing officer and the judge had failed to consider whether his inability to retain accommodation made him vulnerable. The central issue was whether that alleged inability was relevant to vulnerability under paragraph (c).

1. Application refused. This was a second appeal. Permission would have been appropriate if there were a clearly arguable point of general importance, but no such point was open in light of binding authority. In any event, success on the proposed point would not undermine the reviewing officer’s full analysis.
2. Statutory test. Under section 189(a)(c) of the Housing Act, vulnerability arises only in the context of actual homelessness. The relevant inquiry is whether, because of a particular condition, the applicant is less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, with injury or detriment resulting where the ordinary homeless person could cope. The guidance in Pereira [1998] 31 HLR 317 was treated as authoritative and applied.
3. Accommodation history. A risk of losing accommodation while housed is not itself the statutory question. Even if inability to retain accommodation were treated like inability to obtain it, difficulty alone would be insufficient. It would have to arise from a particular condition capable of establishing statutory vulnerability. The medical evidence and the reviewing officer’s findings disclosed no such condition and no exceptional difficulty coping with homelessness.
4. Review of the decision. The court could intervene only if the assessment proceeded on an incorrect understanding of the law or reached a conclusion not reasonably open on the facts. The latter was not arguable, and the officer had considered Mr Littlejohn’s housing difficulties and the cumulative effect of his circumstances. Rix LJ added that obtaining accommodation might in some cases be illusory because of an inability to maintain it, but held that issue was not raised on these facts.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division)—refused Mr Littlejohn’s application for permission to appeal. [2007] EWCA Civ 1562
• Central London Civil Justice Centre—HHJ Behar considered an appeal, in substance a judicial review, from the City of Westminster’s homelessness decision in a judgment dated 23 November 2006.