Santos v Eaton Square Garage Ltd

An appellate court may interfere with an award of general damages only where the judge applied a wrong legal principle, misapprehended the facts or made a wholly erroneous award. A merely different assessment does not suffice.

Guideline categories must be matched to the injuries actually sustained, including the dominant condition and prognosis. Where physical and psychological conditions overlap, their individual values should not simply be added together. The court must adjust the aggregate to avoid double compensation for the same pain, suffering and loss of amenity.

An employee suffered a pelvic fracture, post-traumatic stress disorder and subsequent Chronic Pain Syndrome when a vehicle fell on him at work. Liability was admitted, subject to a 30 per cent deduction for contributory negligence.

HHJ Levy QC awarded £45,000 in general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity as part of a total judgment of £84,121. The employer appealed from the Central London County Court, contending that the general damages award was excessive.

The central issues were the correct use of the Judicial Studies Board guidelines, the valuation of the overlapping orthopaedic and psychological injuries, and whether the difference between the judge's award and the proper figure justified appellate intervention.

1. Appeal allowed. The award of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity was reduced from £45,000 to £32,000. Wilson LJ agreed with the judgment of Maurice Kay LJ.

2. An appellate court does not interfere with a quantum award merely because it would have selected another figure. Intervention requires a wrong principle of law, a misapprehension of fact or a wholly erroneous award. Flint v Lovell [1935] 1 QB 354, Owen v Sykes [1936] 1 QB 192 and Ashdown v Michael [98/0516/2] supported that restrained approach.

3. The orthopaedic injury did not fall within the severe back-injury category. The pelvic fracture was not itself severe or productive of permanent or chronic disability. The accident accelerated symptoms from a pre-existing degenerative back condition by about three years. Assessed independently, the orthopaedic injury was properly valued at £8,000 within the lower part of the relevant moderate category.

4. The psychological consequences predominated. The initial post-traumatic stress disorder lasted about three years and was succeeded by Chronic Pain Syndrome. The continuing syndrome was severe but near the bottom of that range. The prognosis was mixed and allowed for improvement and a return to different work after 18 months. The psychological injury was properly valued at £27,000, comprising £24,000 for Chronic Pain Syndrome and £3,000 for the additional features of the earlier disorder.

5. The figures for overlapping physical and psychological injuries could not simply be aggregated. Simple addition would overcompensate where the psychological condition was related to pain, or the perception of pain, caused by the physical injury. The aggregate of £35,000 therefore required adjustment to £32,000.

6. The difference of £13,000 between £45,000 and £32,000 was sufficiently substantial to make the original award wholly erroneous. Neither litigation costs nor the agreed deduction for contributory negligence precluded intervention. Allowing a substantial departure from the proper bracket to stand would be unfair to both claimants and defendants.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The employer's appeal was allowed. The award of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity was reduced from £45,000 to £32,000: [2007] EWCA Civ 225.

2. Central London County Court: HHJ Levy QC assessed damages after liability and a 30 per cent deduction for contributory negligence had been agreed. He entered judgment for £84,121, including £45,000 in general damages on a full-liability basis.