Mansfield District Council v Langridge

In a secure-tenancy possession claim based on nuisance and other breaches, an appellate court should respect the trial judge’s evaluative discretion on whether possession is reasonable and whether an order should be immediate or suspended. The Court of Appeal will not interfere merely because another judge might have balanced the evidence differently.

Where a tenant’s disability is relevant, the landlord may consider the risk that the tenant will stop taking medication and that harmful behaviour will recur. A later medical report which substantially confirms information already known need not require a fresh assessment. Potential harm to a neighbour’s health may be relevant to nuisance, although proof of actual illness is not necessary under the relevant possession ground.

Paul Derek Langridge, a secure tenant of Mansfield District Council, appealed from an order made by His Honour Judge Mithani in the Nottingham County Court on 28 September 2006. The judge granted the Council immediate possession under Part 4 and Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, relying on breaches of tenancy and nuisance or annoyance to neighbours.

The proposed appeal challenged the assessment of the limited period of proven nuisance, the Council’s consideration of Mr Langridge’s mental disability under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and the use of evidence from a former neighbour concerning potential harm to health. The application was an oral renewal of an application for permission to appeal.

1. Application refused. The proposed grounds disclosed no real prospect of success. They sought to re-argue factual and discretionary assessments made after a careful hearing.
2. On reasonableness, the trial judge was entitled to consider the proven incidents, the possibility of recurrence, and the tenant’s medication. Possession decisions of this kind involve a range of judgment within which experienced trial judges may reasonably reach different conclusions. That possibility does not make the decision arguably wrong or justify permission to appeal (paras 11–12).
3. The Council was entitled to consider Mr Langridge’s mental instability, the mitigating effect of medication, and the risk that he might stop taking it and revert to nuisance and annoyance. The trial judge found that the Council had assessed the disability issue before proceedings were brought. A later medical report, served about a year later and largely confirming what the Council already knew, introduced no new material requiring a different decision or a fresh assessment (paras 13–15).
4. Under ground 2 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, conduct causing or likely to cause nuisance or annoyance was the relevant basis. The potential for illness or other harm to a neighbour’s health was relevant, but it was not a necessary element of that ground (paras 5, 10, 16).
5. The former neighbour’s evidence was capable of informing the assessment of nuisance and potential future harm, even though actual illness had not been proved. The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s analysis and refused the renewed application for permission to appeal (paras 16–18).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 31 January 2007, Lord Justice Auld heard an oral renewal of Mr Langridge’s application for permission to appeal from the Nottingham County Court decision of 28 September 2006. The renewed application was refused: [2007] EWCA Civ 303.
• Nottingham County Court: His Honour Judge Mithani granted Mansfield District Council an immediate order for possession on 28 September 2006.