MA (Rwanda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum appeal, the decision-maker must assess relevant oral, documentary and objective evidence in the round. A determination is not flawed merely because it does not address every aspect of the evidence, or because its reasoning is expressed in an order suggesting that credibility was decided first. The question is whether the evidence was considered before the conclusion and whether omitted material could materially undermine it. Where objective material does not support the asserted chain of events, and contemporaneous documents show that the authorities sought to investigate, the tribunal may reject the account and the claimed absence of protection.

The appellant, a Rwandan national who had obtained refugee status in Uganda, claimed protection in the United Kingdom. He alleged that persons connected with a Rwandan colonel who had persecuted him and taken his property had followed him into Uganda, threatened him and attempted to abduct or kill him. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismissed his appeal after an immigration judge rejected the account and the asserted absence of Ugandan protection. The appellant argued that the judge had failed to engage with background evidence and had assessed credibility before considering supporting letters and police material. The central issue was whether those alleged errors rendered the determination legally unsatisfactory.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Moses gave the leading judgment. Lord Justices Rix and Buxton agreed.

1. The appellant’s account, even if accepted, would have faced formidable difficulties under the Refugee Convention. He had to establish that the events in Uganda occurred without effective protection, amounted to persecutory conduct, and would recur if he returned to Uganda, with the alleged persecutors able to find and pursue him. The decisive issue, however, was the credibility of his account.
2. The background material did not support the asserted chain of events. The material concerning recovery of property in Rwanda did not show that the colonel would send associates to Uganda. A report recording difficulties where a major occupied land made the alleged motive less plausible. Evidence of cooperation between Rwanda and Uganda to curb cross-border crime made it less plausible that Uganda would fail to protect a recognised refugee.
3. Although the immigration judge’s reasoning at paragraphs 19 and 20 contained some infelicities, paragraph 18 made clear that he was entitled to reject both the alleged pursuit and the claimed fear. The absence of any attempt by the appellant to reclaim his property or expose the colonel provided a rational basis for finding the alleged continued pursuit unexplained.
4. The principle in Mibanga v Home Secretary, [2005] EWCA Civ 367, required relevant evidence to be considered in the round. The order in which reasons were set out did not establish a Mibanga error. The judge had considered the appellant’s letters, family letters, police material and his account before reaching the final conclusion. In particular, the Ugandan police letter showed that the authorities were seeking redress rather than ignoring the complaint.
5. The order was: appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the appeal from the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal determination. [2007] EWCA Civ 310.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal — Mr Timson, an immigration judge, dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 27 March 2006 (AIT No. AS/19535/2004).
• An earlier immigration adjudicator had refused the appellant’s asylum claim.