AM (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The assessment of whether a Pakistani Ahmadi faces a real risk of persecution is individual and fact-sensitive. It cannot be determined solely from the religious obligation to propagate the faith. Additional special factors must expose the particular claimant to an identifiable risk of persecution. Strained or immaterial subsidiary findings do not vitiate a decision where the conclusion is independently supported by material findings. A point described as “just arguable” does not satisfy the realistic-prospect threshold under the Civil Procedure Rules 52.3.6(a).

A Pakistani national of the Ahmadi faith claimed asylum on the basis of religious persecution. His application was refused and an appeal to an adjudicator failed, but statutory review led to a fresh hearing before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected aspects of his account, including his claimed preaching and fear of pursuit, and found no real risk of persecution on return. The appeal concerned whether the Tribunal had applied too high a standard, irrationally assessed the evidence, or failed to recognise the risk faced by practising Ahmadis, including on relocation to Rajanpur or Karachi.

Lord Justice Sedley gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Maurice Kay agreed, and Lord Justice Laws agreed for the reasons given. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Under CPR 52.3.6(a), permission to appeal requires a realistic prospect of success or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. A point described as merely “just arguable” falls below that threshold.
2. The proposition that every practising Pakistani Ahmadi is a potential refugee was rejected. Whether an individual faces a real risk of persecution must be determined by the fact-finder on the evidence concerning that individual. The court must consider additional special factors exposing the claimant to an identifiable risk, rather than relying solely on the tenets of the Ahmadi faith and its call to propagate the religion.
3. The Tribunal was entitled to treat the late development of the appellant’s account of preaching and alleged conversions as relevant to credibility. It was also correct on the particular complaint that the interview record showed that he had been reported for preaching, rather than forced to deny his faith.
4. Some subsidiary credibility findings appeared strained and were expressed with unnecessary emphasis. They concerned matters having little, if any, bearing on the asylum risk. The essential conclusion was independently based on material grounds, including that the mosque was no longer a local issue, the land dispute was an accomplished fact, and the appellant was not accepted to be a proselytiser. The detailed chronology of the uncle’s conduct and the circumstances of the appellant’s escape therefore did not disclose an error of law or approach.
5. The human-rights claim stood or fell with the asylum claim. The formal order was: appeal dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [2007] EWCA Civ 339: dismissed the appeal against the Tribunal’s determination dated 20 March 2006.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: after statutory review had remitted the matter for a fresh hearing, Immigration Judges Markham David and Grant rejected the asylum appeal.
3. Earlier proceedings: the asylum application was refused and an appeal to an adjudicator failed before the statutory review.