Glen International Ltd v Triplerose Ltd

A notification under section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 need not use prescribed words. It must, however, objectively communicate an address at which the landlord may be served with notices. A request that solicitors write to an agent at a stated address about identified matters does not, without more, amount to such a notification.

Where no effective section 48 address has been notified, section 99(3) of the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 permits service at the last address furnished under section 47. Service at that address is effective.

The tenant served a notice seeking a new lease under section 42 of the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. It sent the notice by recorded delivery to two addresses. The landlord received it at Middlesex House, an address previously furnished under section 47 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987.

The landlord had not served a counter-notice. It contended that a later letter from its agent, asking the tenant's solicitors to write to the agent at another address, was a section 48 notification. It also contended that the solicitors had authority to receive such a notification. HHJ Williams held that the tenant was entitled to a new lease. The landlord appealed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the order that the tenant was entitled to a new lease. The notice was validly served at Middlesex House.

2. Section 99(3) of the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 gives priority to an address furnished under section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. If no such address has been furnished, the relevant address is the last address furnished under section 47.

3. The letter of 18 October 2004 was not a section 48 notice. Applying the approach summarised in Drew Morgan v Hamid-Zadeh [1999] 2 EGLR 13, no formula was required. Yet the letter had to be read objectively in its factual setting. The correspondence concerned only dilapidations and insurance, and the request to write to the agent concerned those ongoing matters. It did not communicate that the address was one for all statutory notices relating to the lease.

4. Accordingly, Middlesex House remained the section 99 address by virtue of section 47. The tenant sent the notice there by recorded delivery and it was accepted. Since the landlord served no counter-notice, the first-instance judge was bound to make the order.

5. Munby J also held, alternatively, that the tenant's solicitors lacked authority to receive a section 48 notification. The general agency principle stated in Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v Rayner (1880) 14 (Ch) 406 remained applicable. The authorities where an agent could receive a notice depended on facts showing general control, full authority, or a broad retainer. Here the solicitors acted only on dilapidations and insurance. Jacob LJ did not reach a concluded view on that alternative point, but agreed that the appeal should be dismissed; Tuckey LJ also agreed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the landlord's appeal and affirmed the tenant's entitlement to a new lease: [2007] EWCA Civ 388.
• Woolwich County Court — HHJ Williams held that the tenant was entitled to a new lease after the landlord failed to serve a counter-notice.