Lawrence v Pembrokeshire County Council

The common law does not impose a duty of care on public authorities or their employees to parents honestly suspected of abusing their children when investigating or taking protective steps, even if the suspicion later proves unfounded. The potential conflict between protecting the child and protecting the parent from interference with family life justifies that rule. The advent of Article 8 and the Human Rights Act 1998 does not require a parallel negligence remedy. Article 8 addresses interference and its justification, whereas negligence concerns the existence of a duty. No separate distinction arises between doctors and social workers, or between direct and indirect involvement. The appeal was dismissed.

Mrs Lawrence appealed from Field J’s order of 13 June 2006, which struck out her negligence claim against Pembrokeshire County Council and entered judgment for the Council. Her claims arose from the placing of her children on the Child Protection Register after social workers suspected parental abuse. She alleged breach of Article 8 and psychiatric injury caused by negligence. The Council accepted that an Article 8 claim was arguable but relied on the limitation period under the Human Rights Act 1998. On the negligence claim, it relied on the House of Lords’ decision in JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust & Ors [2005] 2 AC 373. The central issue was whether Article 8 required the common law to recognise a duty of care to parents in child-protection investigations.

1. Appeal dismissed. Auld LJ gave the leading judgment. Scott Baker LJ and Richards LJ agreed.
2. The Court followed the common ratio of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in East Berkshire [2005] 2 AC 373: public authorities and their employees do not owe parents a common-law duty of care when investigating suspected parental abuse or taking protective steps, where the suspicion is honestly held. The rule applies to social workers as well as doctors and other healthcare professionals. The later discovery that the suspicion was unfounded is irrelevant to whether the duty should exist at the investigation stage.
3. The coming into force of Article 8 and the Human Rights Act 1998 did not alter that conclusion. Article 8 is concerned with interference with family life and whether that interference is justified under Article 8(2). It does not establish a negligence duty. Importing the burden and structure of Article 8 justification into negligence would distort the common-law action. The existing rule is compatible with Article 8.
4. The potential conflict between the child’s safety and the parent’s interest in preserving family life is a sufficient public-policy reason to exclude the parental duty. The risk of inhibition must be addressed before the truth is known, so it is not appropriate to leave the issue to a case-by-case assessment of breach. The decisions in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 and B v Attorney General of New Zealand [2003] 4 All ER 833 supported that approach.
5. There was no material distinction based on the professional’s role or on whether the alleged harm resulted from face-to-face conduct. Proximity had no separate role in this context beyond reasonable foreseeability and the question whether imposing a duty would be fair, just and reasonable. The family-support duty in Part III of the Children Act 1989, including section 17(1)(b), did not support a duty to suspected parents where family preservation might conflict with child safety.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed in [2007] EWCA Civ 446.
• High Court, Field J: On 13 June 2006, the negligence claim was struck out and judgment was entered for the Council. The Article 8 claim was arguable, subject to the limitation issue.