MT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Whether an adult enjoys family life with an adult relative for the purposes of article 8 depends on the circumstances of the particular case. The relationship ordinarily requires dependency beyond normal emotional ties, but its existence is primarily a factual judgment for the specialist tribunal.

Proportionality does not depend on a separate legal test of exceptionality. The tribunal must strike a fair balance for itself, recognising the substantial public interest in immigration control. Its evaluative conclusion must be respected unless it was legally unavailable, irrational or inadequately reasoned.

The appellant, a Zimbabwean national, had lived with her cousin and his family since becoming orphaned at the age of 14. Her cousin acted as a father figure and later received refugee status in the United Kingdom. An adjudicator dismissed her asylum claim but allowed her appeal under article 8, finding family life involving dependency beyond normal emotional ties and concluding that removal would interfere with it disproportionately.

The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal reversed the article 8 decision. It held that the evidence did not establish qualifying family life and that the circumstances were insufficiently exceptional to outweigh immigration control. The appellant challenged whether the Tribunal had identified any error of law permitting it to overturn the adjudicator's factual and proportionality judgments.

1. Appeal allowed. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had not established an error of law in the adjudicator's conclusion that the appellant enjoyed family life with her cousin and his family. The adjudicator's determination was restored.

2. Per Buxton LJ, with whom Waller and Lloyd LJJ agreed, family life between an adult child and a parent or parent figure ordinarily requires further elements of dependency involving more than normal emotional ties. Whether that standard is satisfied depends on the circumstances of the individual case. Once the correct standard has been recognised, the nature of the relationship is essentially a factual judgment for the tribunal which heard the evidence.

3. The adjudicator was entitled to rely on the duration of the relationship, its beginning when the appellant became an orphan at 14, her integration into the cousin's family, the relevant cultural norm, their shared experiences in Zimbabwe and the cousin's role as a father figure. Those matters could support a finding of dependency beyond normal emotional ties. The conclusion was available on the evidence despite its arguably generous character and concise reasoning.

4. Under article 8.2, the appellate immigration authority must exercise its own judgment and strike a fair balance between the individual's family life and the public interest in immigration control. The authority need not apply an additional legal test of exceptionality. References in Razgar to a small minority of exceptional cases expressed an expectation about outcomes rather than a governing test.

5. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had erroneously treated exceptionality as a legal requirement. Although family life will not usually prevail over lawful immigration control, labels such as “exceptional” or “rare” do not identify the principle by which cases are to be decided.

6. Evaluative factual judgments on proportionality are primarily for the specialist tribunal. Different tribunals may lawfully reach different conclusions on the same facts. A conclusion which appears unusually generous does not thereby disclose an error of law or create a precedent for factually similar cases. The adjudicator had appreciated the importance of immigration control and was entitled to give substantial weight to the unusual intensity of the appellant's dependency.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal under article 8 and restored the adjudicator's determination: [2007] EWCA Civ 455.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: Upheld the dismissal of the asylum claim but reversed the adjudicator's article 8 decision and dismissed the human rights appeal.
3. Adjudicator: Dismissed the asylum appeal and the claims under articles 2 and 3, but allowed the appeal under article 8.