North v North

[2007] EWCA Civ 760

Case details

Case citations
[2007] EWCA Civ 760 · [2007] All ER (D) 386 (Jul) · [2008] 1 FLR 158
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
25 July 2007
Judgment text

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Subjects
Family Financial remedies Variation of periodical payments
Keywords
nominal periodical payments upward variation capitalisation financial needs self-generated needs financial mismanagement investment losses clean break appellate intervention adequacy of reasons
Outcome
appeal allowed; final amount, if any, reserved for written submissions
Judicial consideration

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Summary

On an application to increase nominal periodical payments, the court’s overriding objective under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 section 31 is a result fair to both parties. Although need will usually be the dominant factor, the paying former spouse is not an insurer against every later financial hazard.

The court may decline to impose responsibility for needs generated by the applicant’s financial mismanagement, extravagance, irresponsibility or lifestyle choices. No separate threshold requires the applicant first to prove unsuccessful self-help. The causes, weight and relevance of the asserted needs must instead be assessed within the broad statutory discretion.

Factual background

Following their divorce, the wife received a mortgage-free home, income-producing ground rents and a nominal periodical payments order. She later sold her English assets, moved to Australia and suffered investment losses. Her remaining capital and income were further reduced by expenditure and legal costs.

District Judge Greene increased the nominal order and capitalised annual payments of £16,500 into a lump sum of £202,000. Charles J dismissed the husband’s first appeal. The Court of Appeal considered whether the award was incompatible with findings that the wife had created much of her need through her own choices, and whether her application should consequently be dismissed as a matter of principle.

Held

  1. Appeal allowed. The District Judge’s order could not stand. His conclusion did not flow logically from his findings that the wife would have remained comfortably provided for but for her choices and that the husband should not bear responsibility for the resulting deficit. The unexplained transition to an award of £16,500 per year created a fundamental contradiction. The broad-brush nature of the assessment did not remove the need for a reasoned connection between findings, needs, available income and the amount awarded.

  2. Thorpe LJ held that the wife’s application did not fail automatically as a matter of principle. Neither statute nor authority excluded the matters on which she relied. Their relevance and weight had to be assessed within the broad discretion conferred by section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The suggested preliminary requirement that the wife prove that her best endeavours at self-help had failed was correctly rejected below.

  3. The overriding objective under section 31 is fairness to both the applicant and the respondent. Need will commonly be the dominant or magnetic consideration, but an established need does not inevitably become the respondent’s financial responsibility. A former spouse is not an insurer against all hazards and need not compensate for needs created by financial mismanagement, extravagance or irresponsibility.

  4. The wife’s failure to exploit her earning capacity, abandonment of the secure financial future provided in England, decision to adopt a more hazardous future in Australia and Australian lifestyle choices generated needs for which fairness did not make the husband legally responsible. Investment losses were potentially different. Conventional stock-market investment carried ordinary risk, and losses might be characterised as misfortune rather than mismanagement.

  5. May LJ and Bennett J agreed that the District Judge’s order lacked a reasoned basis and that the appeal should be allowed. The court did not finally determine whether a modest capitalised award remained appropriate. It invited brief written submissions and retained the matter for its own determination because remittal or further oral argument would have been disproportionate.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the husband’s appeal from Charles J because the District Judge’s award was logically incompatible with his material findings. The court reserved determination of any residual capitalised award for written submissions: [2007] EWCA Civ 760.

  2. High Court, Family Division: Charles J dismissed the husband’s appeal on 9 November 2006. No neutral citation is stated.

  3. Principal Registry of the Family Division: District Judge Greene varied the nominal periodical payments order and ordered a lump sum of £202,000 to capitalise and dismiss the wife’s periodical-payments claim. No neutral citation is stated.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed; final amount, if any, reserved for written submissions

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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