C (children), Re

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal challenges a binding order for which the court below had jurisdiction and the challenge has no reasonable prospect of success. A property adjustment order under the Matrimonial Causes Act may transfer one joint owner’s interest to the other after decree absolute, where the order was made in the matrimonial proceedings. A bare application concerning children, unsupported by a statement or other material, may be dismissed; a parent seeking residence or contact must make a properly supported fresh application. The court emphasised that separated parents should play as full a part as possible in their children’s lives and rejected the suggestion of gender bias in family proceedings.

Mr C applied for permission to appeal against three Brighton County Court orders. One order, dated 30 November 2006, adjourned enforcement proceedings because service had not been effected. A further order, dated 14 December 2006, apparently authorised execution of transfer documents and related steps to enforce an earlier financial order dated 28 October 2005. Permission to appeal that earlier order had already been refused by Wilson LJ.

Mr C also renewed an application for permission to appeal against the dismissal, on 8 May 2006, of his application under the Children Act concerning residence or contact. The central issues were whether the enforcement steps were within the judge’s jurisdiction and whether there was a proper basis for appealing the dismissal of the children application.

1. All applications refused. The appeal concerning the 30 November 2006 adjournment was unnecessary and academic. The judge had been right to adjourn for service, and the order had been spent.
2. The financial order of 28 October 2005 was binding. Permission to appeal it had been refused, so it stood and could be enforced. The judge had jurisdiction to execute documents implementing that order. The application concerning the 14 December 2006 order therefore had no reasonable prospect of success.
3. The court rejected the appellant’s construction of the Family Law Act 1996. The relevant property was jointly owned, rather than held under a tenancy in the sense of a rented property. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, the jurisdiction to make a property adjustment order arose on decree nisi, and the transfer of one party’s interest could take effect after decree absolute. Section 24 was identified as explaining that jurisdiction.
4. The 8 May 2006 children order was based only on a notice of application. There was no supporting statement or other material, and the application had not been renewed before the judge. There was consequently no useful issue for this court to determine by way of appeal. If the appellant sought residence, contact or other welfare relief, he should make a fresh and properly supported application, with a statement and, where appropriate, conciliation, mediation and investigation by CAFCASS.
5. The court added that the door remained open to a properly formulated application. It stated that the courts attach importance to fathers’ involvement and that there is no gender bias in family proceedings. The applications were formally refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2007] EWCA Civ 884. Permission to appeal against the Brighton County Court orders was refused.
• Brighton County Court: Orders dated 30 November 2006, 14 December 2006 and 8 May 2006. The enforcement application was adjourned and later acted upon; the children application was dismissed.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against the financial order dated 28 October 2005 had previously been refused by Wilson LJ, so that order remained binding.