Mazour, R. v

On an appeal against sentence for causing death by dangerous driving, the appellate court will interfere only where the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. Driving while over the alcohol limit, at greatly excessive speed, while showing off, despite a warning and against a pattern of excessive speed, can place the offence in the highest culpability category.

A late guilty plea may properly attract a moderated discount. Good character remains mitigation, but its weight is limited in a case of exceptionally serious dangerous driving.

The appellant pleaded guilty, shortly before trial, to causing death by dangerous driving. He had driven his high-performance car through central London after drinking alcohol. It reached more than 80 mph before he lost control in the Piccadilly underpass. His front-seat passenger was killed and six people in other vehicles were injured.

He was sentenced to six-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. With leave of the single judge, he appealed on the basis that the sentencing judge had not given sufficient credit for his guilty plea, previous good character and personal mitigation. The central issue was whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that the sentence of six-and-a-half years’ imprisonment was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. The sentencing judge was entitled, and effectively bound on the facts, to place the offending in the highest culpability category under the criteria in Cooksley, as modified by Richardson [2006] EWCA Crim. 3186. The appellant drove while one-and-a-half times over the alcohol limit, at greatly excessive speed, while showing off the vehicle’s acceleration. There was evidence of a warning from the deceased’s girlfriend and of repeated excessive speeding earlier that night.

3. Richardson identified a sentencing bracket of seven to 14 years for offending of that seriousness. A starting point of nine years was therefore at the bottom of the appropriate bracket. The death of the passenger and the serious injuries suffered by six others reinforced the gravity of the consequences.

4. The guilty plea was entered relatively shortly before trial. The judge could therefore moderate the credit allowed for it. The appellant’s good character, ability, remorse and the impact of imprisonment were relevant mitigation, but could not carry their usual weight in the context of exceptionally serious dangerous driving.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By judgment dated 23 May 2007, [2007] EWCA Crim 1427, dismissed the appeal against sentence.
• Sentencing court: The appellant pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving on 30 November 2006 and, on 7 December 2006, received six-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. The court and any citation were not stated in the judgment.