Campbell v R

Once evidence of a defendant’s bad character has been admitted through a statutory gateway, the jury may use it in any respect in which it is relevant. The gateway governs admissibility, not the subsequent use of the evidence. A general propensity for untruthfulness will rarely be an important issue under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Directions on bad character should be tailored to the evidence and expressed in simple terms. They should warn against treating previous convictions as proof of guilt or giving them undue weight. Specimen directions are not rigid formulae. An unhelpful reference to credibility will not make a conviction unsafe unless it could have affected the verdict.

The appellant was convicted at Reading Crown Court of false imprisonment and assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed against a woman with whom he had used drugs. He denied both violence and preventing her from leaving. The prosecution relied on two admitted previous convictions for violence against former girlfriends, said to demonstrate a propensity for violence towards women.

The trial judge gave a standard bad-character direction. It included a statement that the jury could consider whether the appellant’s previous convictions assisted them in deciding whether his evidence was truthful. The appellant appealed against conviction, contending that this direction was inappropriate and rendered the verdict unsafe.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The jury had properly received the appellant’s two previous convictions as evidence of a propensity for violence towards women. Their admission under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was not challenged on appeal.
2. The court rejected the submission that evidence admitted through one statutory gateway could be used only for the purpose which justified admission. Following R v Highton and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1985, the distinction is between admissibility and use. Once admitted, the jury may give bad-character evidence significance in any respect in which it is relevant.
3. A propensity for untruthfulness will not normally be an important matter in issue merely because the defendant has pleaded not guilty. Whether a defendant is telling the truth will ordinarily turn on whether he committed the offence. The exceptional case is one in which lying is an element of the offence, particularly where the lies are connected with criminal conduct.
4. Bad-character directions should assist the jury by explaining, in simple and case-specific terms, why the evidence may matter. The jury must be warned not to give previous convictions undue weight or treat them as proof of guilt. The court endorsed the flexible approach in R v Hanson and others [2005] EWCA Crim 824 and R v Edwards and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1813. A specimen direction is not a mandatory formula.
5. The reference to the appellant’s credibility was unhelpful, although not inaccurate. Unlike R v Meyer [2006] EWCA Crim 1126, it could not have affected the verdict. The similar previous violence gave cogent support to the complainant’s account, and the judge gave an equivalent caution concerning the complainant’s drug misuse. The conviction was therefore safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against conviction was dismissed in [2007] EWCA Crim 1472.
• Reading Crown Court: The appellant was convicted on 7 September 2006 of false imprisonment and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On 30 November 2006, he received an indeterminate sentence for public protection for the false-imprisonment offence.