Singh, R. v

Evidence admitted through gateway G in section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 need not show either a propensity to commit the charged offence or a propensity for untruthfulness. Gateway G applies where the accused attacks a witness’s character, even if the attack is integral to the defence case rather than gratuitous.

Once properly admitted, the evidence may be weighed in assessing the accused’s credibility, but cannot by itself prove guilt. A trial judge’s discretionary decision under section 101(3) will be disturbed only for misdirection or a conclusion outside the legitimate range of decisions. A jury direction is sufficient if it identifies the limited purpose of the evidence and gives an adequate warning against convicting solely because of bad character.

The appellant was tried on charges of robbery and a later assault upon the same complainant. His defence alleged that the complainant had sought and used crack cocaine, and that another person, not the appellant, had taken the complainant’s property.

Following that attack on the complainant’s character, the Recorder admitted the appellant’s previous convictions under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Recorder then directed the jury that the convictions could be considered when assessing the appellant’s truthfulness, but could not by themselves prove guilt.

The appellant challenged both the admission of the evidence and, principally, the adequacy of the direction.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Recorder was entitled to admit the appellant’s bad-character evidence and his direction to the jury was adequate.

2. Gateway G under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is not confined to gratuitous attacks upon a witness. Its purpose is to allow the jury to know the nature of the source from which allegations damaging to a witness’s character have come. An attack remains within the gateway where it is necessarily made as part of the accused’s chosen defence.

3. The statutory gateways are independent. Evidence admitted through gateway G need not demonstrate a propensity to commit the charged offence or a propensity for untruthfulness. If it also establishes such a propensity, the jury may use it for that purpose: see R v Highton and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 1985. That was not the basis on which the evidence was admitted here.

4. Once gateway G has been passed, the jury may weigh the accused’s bad character, with all the other evidence, when deciding whether the accused is to be believed. The convictions did not show a track record of false statements and would not independently have been admissible under gateway D. Nevertheless, they were relevant to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of competing accounts after the appellant had attacked the complainant’s credibility.

5. The Court of Appeal would interfere with the judge’s exercise of discretion under section 101(3) only if the judge misdirected himself or reached a conclusion outside the legitimate range of decisions. Neither condition was met. The Recorder’s reasoning and decision were plainly correct.

6. The direction clearly explained why the jury had heard the evidence, permitted consideration of it in assessing the appellant’s evidence, identified the absence of prior dishonesty or false statements, and warned that bad character could not itself prove guilt. No further express warning that the evidence did not establish either relevant propensity was required on the facts of the case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against the admission of bad-character evidence and the jury direction: [2007] EWCA Crim 2140.
• Trial court — the Recorder admitted the appellant’s previous convictions under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 after the defence attacked the complainant’s character. The lower-court citation was not stated in the judgment.