Chohanl, R. v

An appeal based on allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts succeeds only where the appellant shows both a real inconsistency and that no legitimate train of reasoning can sensibly explain it, so that the conviction is unsafe. A jury may reach different verdicts against co-defendants where the evidence permits different findings about their knowledge or involvement.

Where the jury has been directed to consider each defendant separately and no objection is taken, an appellant cannot ordinarily later contend that a differing verdict was impermissible. Any contention that the prosecution case required identical verdicts must be raised before the jury is directed, so that the trial judge can give an appropriate direction.

The appellant and her brother were tried at Birmingham Crown Court for money laundering contrary to section 93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. The allegation concerned an arrangement under which the appellant’s husband transferred the matrimonial home to the brother, said to facilitate the husband’s retention or control of criminal property.

The brother was acquitted, but the appellant was convicted by a majority verdict and sentenced to 80 hours’ community service. She appealed on the ground that her conviction was unsafe because the acquittal of her brother was inconsistent with it. The central issue was whether a legitimate evidential basis existed for the jury to distinguish between their respective knowledge of the funds and the arrangement.

1. Appeal dismissed. The verdicts were not irrationally inconsistent and the appellant’s conviction was safe.

2. The court applied the approach stated in R v WM, transcript 98/3892/W4 of 30 March 1999. An appellant must first establish a logical inconsistency between the verdicts. The appellant must then show that no legitimate chain of reasoning can account for it, or that the verdict cannot be regarded as safe. The court must not usurp the jury’s role by demanding a flawless reconstruction of its reasoning.

3. The trial judge had properly directed the jury to consider each defendant separately. Their evidence and possible knowledge differed. The jury could rationally be sure that the appellant, who lived with her husband and dealt with funds used for mortgage payments, knew the criminal source or true purpose of the arrangement, while not being sure that her brother did. The differing verdicts were therefore open on the evidence.

4. If the appellant’s case was that the prosecution presentation made a conviction of her impossible following her brother’s acquittal, that point had to be raised before the jury was directed. The judge could then have been asked to direct that the verdicts must be the same. No such objection was made, and the prosecution would in any event have made clear that it relied on the possibility of differing knowledge. A later allegation of perversity could not succeed where the verdict was open on the evidence and reached under unchallenged directions.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2007] EWCA Crim 3175.
• Birmingham Crown Court: the appellant was convicted of money laundering by a majority of 10 to 2; her co-defendant brother was acquitted.