Currie, R v

The notice requirements for road-traffic offences are procedural safeguards, not elements of the substantive offence. In Crown Court proceedings, the judge determines factual issues arising under sections 1 and 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, including whether the accident exception applies.

Where the prosecution relies on that exception, it must prove the accident to the criminal standard. An accident under section 2(1) has an ordinary, context-sensitive meaning. It is not confined to an unintended occurrence with an adverse physical result. The question is whether an untoward occurrence arose owing to the vehicle’s presence on the road.

The appellant was convicted at Maidstone Crown Court of dangerous driving. No notice of intended prosecution had been served.

The prosecution contended that notice was unnecessary because an accident had occurred when the appellant drove away while a police officer was in front of, and then holding onto, his vehicle. The appellant denied dangerous driving and denied that there had been an accident.

The trial judge decided the factual issue himself, found that an accident had occurred, and held that the statutory notice requirement did not apply. The appeal raised whether that issue was for judge or jury, the burden and standard of proof, and the meaning of accident in section 2(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

Appeal dismissed. The conviction for dangerous driving was safe.

1. The notice regime in sections 1 and 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is procedural. Its purpose is to prevent surprise by giving a defendant timely notice of the relevant motoring event. It does not add elements to the offence charged.

2. Accordingly, the judge, rather than the jury, determines factual issues arising under that regime in a Crown Court trial. That includes whether the section 2(1) accident exception applies. The position differs from a provision under which proof of an accident is itself an essential condition of the charged offence or of a statutory power.

3. The trial judge erred in treating section 1(3) as placing a burden on the appellant. The prosecution relied on the positive assertion that an accident had occurred and therefore bore the burden of proving it to the criminal standard. The error did not render the conviction unsafe because the judge unequivocally accepted the police evidence and rejected the appellant’s account; the factual conclusion did not depend on the erroneous allocation of the burden.

4. An accident in section 2(1) is to be given its ordinary, common-sense meaning in the statutory context. It is not confined to an unintended occurrence with an adverse physical result. A deliberate act within the causal sequence does not necessarily prevent the resulting untoward occurrence from being an accident. The court also endorsed, though physical contact existed on these facts, the view that physical impact is not indispensable.

5. The officer had to steady herself against the front of the car and was later thrown from the open passenger door as the car reversed at speed. The judge was entitled to find an accident. The prosecution was therefore exempt from serving a notice under section 1, and the conviction stood.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the dangerous-driving conviction ([2007] EWCA Crim 926).
• Crown Court at Maidstone: Judge McKinnon and a jury convicted the appellant of dangerous driving on 17 February 2006.