Bezant v Rausing & Ors

Claims may be struck out where they disclose no reasonable legal grounds, and summary judgment may be given where the claimant has no real prospect of success. The court must not resolve genuinely disputed facts on a summary application, but may act where the asserted facts cannot be established.

Abuse of process is a broad, merits-based concept. It may arise where later proceedings relitigate matters which should have been raised earlier, collaterally attack final decisions, seek to circumvent a statutory employment remedy, or pursue a benefit so disproportionate to the likely result that the litigation misuses court resources. These principles apply even where the claimant is unrepresented, although the draconian nature of striking out requires a clear case.

Mr Richard Bezant brought three actions against Dr Hans Rausing and other individuals connected with his former employers. The Contract action alleged an agreement to continue settlement discussions. The Libel action concerned statements about Portuguese civil and criminal proceedings. The Misfeasance action alleged negligence, deceit and breaches of the Companies Act 1985 and Insolvency Act 1986.

The defendants applied under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 for strike-out or summary judgment. They also alleged abuse of process, including an attempt to obtain through tort claims compensation for dismissal which had already been refused in employment and Portuguese proceedings. The central issues were whether any claim was legally sustainable or had a real prospect of success, and whether the proceedings were abusive.

1. Summary disposal. Under CPR 3.4(1)(a), a statement of case may be struck out where it discloses no reasonable grounds, including an unwinnable claim which would waste resources. Under CPR 24.2(a)(i), summary judgment is appropriate where the claimant has no real prospect of success. The court should not decide disputed facts, but may act where the asserted facts cannot realistically be established. The possibility of amendment should be considered, particularly where a litigant appears in person.
2. Contract and deceit. The correspondence did not create the alleged binding obligation to continue negotiations until settlement. An agreement to negotiate, or to use best endeavours to reach an agreement or settlement, is uncertain and unenforceable. The without-prejudice rule did not prevent reliance on a concluded agreement, but no such agreement was shown. The deceit claim also failed because the alleged misrepresentation of intention was inadequately particularised and the words relied upon did not promise indefinite negotiations.
3. Libel. There was no evidence that Dr Rausing authorised or knew of the publications. The communications were protected by qualified privilege, and the pleaded case of malice lacked evidential support. Publication to the claimant’s daughter was also unsustainable on the pleaded facts. The claim was in any event disproportionate, since any recoverable damages and vindication would have been minimal.
4. Misfeasance and negligence. The individual defendants had not assumed responsibility for Mr Bezant’s economic welfare, and there was no pleaded reliance or sufficient proximity. Directors, solicitors, advisers, auditors, witnesses and liquidators do not ordinarily owe the claimant the alleged personal duties in the circumstances. Claims based on duties owed to companies or creditors could not be recovered by Mr Bezant personally.
5. Statutory claims. The provisions of the Companies Act 1985 did not provide a viable route to damages. The relevant removal provisions did not displace an alternative power under the articles, and no loss was shown. Sections 89 and 206 to 211 of the Insolvency Act 1986 created criminal offences or otherwise did not confer the asserted private right of action. Sections 213, 238 and 239 conferred rights on a liquidator or administrator, not on Mr Bezant.
6. Abuse of process. The Misfeasance action improperly sought to circumvent the statutory employment framework and to attack final decisions by recasting dismissal losses as tortious claims against individuals. It also involved matters which should have been raised in earlier proceedings. The Contract action pursued a collateral advantage and disproportionate pressure. The Libel action was likewise abusive on Jameel grounds.
7. All three actions were struck out, with summary judgment for the relevant defendants. The court also declared that the English courts had no jurisdiction over claims concerning Mr Bezant’s removal as a director of the Portuguese company; those claims were dismissed. The question of an Extended Civil Restraint Order was adjourned for argument after hand-down.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier adverse decisions in employment, Portuguese civil and criminal-related proceedings, and related applications, but no appeal from this judgment.