Noorani v Calver

In determining whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the court must assess their natural and ordinary meaning in context, from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable person. Serious allegations are not converted into mere vulgar abuse merely because they were spoken in an informal setting. A defamation claim may nevertheless be an abuse of process where publication was extremely limited, caused little or no real damage, offered no practical need for vindication, and the likely benefit is wholly disproportionate to the costs of trial. Evidence of conduct on another occasion may be admissible to support an inference of malice in relation to a privileged publication, although its admissibility or relevance may need to be reconsidered after the evidence is heard.

The claimant brought libel proceedings concerning a letter circulated to members of a political association and a separate slander claim concerning alleged words spoken to his wife and teenage daughter. The defendant applied to strike out the slander allegation before trial.

The application raised three issues: whether the alleged words were capable of being defamatory rather than vulgar abuse; whether they imputed a criminal offence and were therefore actionable without proof of special damage; and whether the claim was an abuse of process because publication was limited and the likely damage was minimal. The court also considered whether evidence of the alleged conversation should remain admissible on the issue of malice in the libel claim.

1. Capacity to be defamatory. The court must evaluate the words complained of, determine the range of meanings reasonably open to them, and apply the natural and ordinary meaning which they would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader or hearer. Context is important, but the court must avoid forced or over-elaborate analysis. Although the conversation was brief and informal, describing a person as an Islamist terrorist was sufficiently serious to be capable of defamatory meaning. The words were not properly characterised as mere vulgar abuse.
2. Actionable per se. The allegation that the claimant was a terrorist was capable of imputing serious criminal conduct. It was unnecessary for the allegation to identify a particular role such as bomber or assassin. The claim therefore passed the second threshold for an action without proof of special damage.
3. Abuse of process. Applying the principles in Jameel v Dow Jones and Co Inc [2005] QB 946, the court considered the limited publication, the fact that the only publishees were the claimant’s wife and daughter, the weak evidence of reputational damage, the absence of any practical need for vindication, and the disproportion between likely damages and the costs of a full trial. Taken together, those matters meant that the claim could not constitute a real and substantial tort. The slander allegation was struck out as an abuse of process.
4. Malice evidence. Malice is for the jury where there is evidence capable of supporting it. Evidence of conduct on another occasion may legitimately support an inference that a defendant acted from personal spite or another improper motive on a privileged occasion. It was premature to rule out all evidence concerning the alleged conversation, although the issue could be revisited after the oral evidence. The evidence remained admissible in principle, despite the separate slander allegation being struck out.