S, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Sutton

Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 imposes a duty to accommodate a child in need where the statutory conditions are met and the child appears to require accommodation. The assessment must distinguish between accommodation under section 20 and assistance with accommodation under section 17 or housing legislation. A local authority may consider the child’s wishes and the suitability of the proposed accommodation, but cannot avoid section 20 merely by referring the child to its housing function. A lawful assessment must be analytical and forward-looking. It should identify needs, specify the services required, allocate responsibility, set a timetable and provide for review.

The claimant, a 17-year-old released from a detention and training order, sought judicial review of Sutton’s decisions concerning accommodation, leaving-care status and assessment of need. She had previously lived with her father and later with a family friend after a bail placement failed. Sutton accepted that she was a child in need but concluded that she was not a looked-after or eligible child and that accommodation should be arranged through housing services.

She was released into accommodation arranged near her father, which she later left. The central issues were whether she had been accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, whether Sutton owed a duty to accommodate her on release, and whether its assessment complied with the statutory guidance.

1. Leaving-care status. J’s father had been objectively prevented from providing suitable accommodation when the placement with him failed. Section 20(1)(c) was therefore satisfied at that time. However, the evidence did not establish that Sutton had provided accommodation to J through the family friend in the exercise of its section 20 functions. The order of the Crown Court did not place J in Sutton’s care, and the arrangement appeared to be a private provision of accommodation. J was therefore not looked after for the prescribed 13-week period and was not an eligible child under paragraph 19B of Schedule 2.
2. Section 20 duty on release. Section 20 requires not merely that one of the conditions in subsection (1) is present, but also that the child appears to the authority to require accommodation. The statutory scheme can be reconciled with the guidance by distinguishing accommodation under section 20 from suitable assistance with accommodation. A child who needs only the latter does not require accommodation under section 20. J’s acceptance of suitable accommodation at Wayside meant that, at the relevant date, she did not require accommodation under section 20. Sutton was not then under a duty to accommodate her under that provision.
3. Sutton had misunderstood the relationship between section 20 and housing priority need. A child owed accommodation under section 20 is excluded from priority need by article 3(2) of the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002. The order did not otherwise remove a local authority’s power to provide accommodation to a 16- or 17-year-old child in need.
4. Assessment. Sutton’s Core Assessment was unlawful. It was insufficiently analytical, failed to explain why the proposed housing arrangement met J’s needs, and did not provide a realistic plan of action identifying services, responsibility, timescale and review. There would be a declaration to that effect, with liberty to apply if a further lawful assessment was not completed within 28 working days.
5. The claimant’s costs were ordered to be paid by Sutton as to 50 per cent, reflecting Sutton’s earlier admission of a section 20 duty. Permission to appeal was granted.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment records that permission to appeal was granted.