G, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Southwark

Under section 20(1) of the Children Act 1989, a local authority must provide accommodation where a child in need appears to require it because the person caring for him cannot provide suitable accommodation or care. The authority must make a distinct evaluative judgment on that requirement. It may conclude that a sufficiently capable and resourceful young person needs only help to secure accommodation under section 17, provided the decision is based on the child’s needs and is not driven by the financial consequences of section 20 accommodation. Where the section 20 duty applies, the Children Act regime takes precedence over the Housing Act regime, and the authority cannot avoid its further duties by referring the child to its housing department.

A 17-year-old who could not return to his mother’s home sought accommodation from Southwark. Children’s Services assessed him and identified housing and education as his primary needs, but concluded that housing-department assistance and referrals to other agencies were sufficient. Southwark therefore decided that section 20 accommodation was unnecessary and referred him to its Homeless Persons Unit, which accommodated him under the Housing Act 1996.

Simon J refused permission to move for judicial review, holding that Southwark was entitled to evaluate whether G required accommodation. The Court of Appeal considered the relationship between sections 17 and 20 of the Children Act 1989, the 2003 Circular and the Housing Act regime. The central issue was whether Southwark lawfully concluded that G required only help with accommodation.

1. Majority disposition. By a majority, the appeal was dismissed. Longmore LJ delivered the principal judgment, and Pill LJ agreed with it. Rix LJ dissented and would have allowed the appeal and made the declaration sought.
2. Section 20(1) requires the local authority to decide whether the child appears to require accommodation. That is an evaluative judgment. Satisfaction of the other section 20(1) criteria does not automatically establish that accommodation is required under section 20.
3. The distinction drawn by Local Authority Circular LAC (2003) 13 between requiring accommodation and requiring help with accommodation is lawful. Section 17(6), as amended by section 116(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, leaves room for assistance under section 17 where section 20 accommodation is not required. The assessment must consider the child’s needs and wishes and feelings, and must disregard the financial consequences of section 20 accommodation.
4. Where the section 20 duty applies, the Children Act regime takes precedence over general duties under section 17 and the Housing Act 1996. A local authority must not use referral to its housing department or a different statutory label to avoid section 20 duties.
5. On the majority’s reading of the assessment and decision letter, Southwark was entitled to conclude that G did not appear to require section 20 accommodation. The assessment described him as resourceful and considered housing-department accommodation and referrals sufficient. The decision was legally open to Southwark, and the court should not substitute its own evaluation.
6. Rix LJ considered that G’s genuine need for accommodation, arising from section 20(1)(c), meant that Southwark could not refer him to housing. That dissenting analysis did not command the majority.
7. Costs were ordered against the appellant, subject to assessment and the protections specified for publicly funded proceedings. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2008] EWCA Civ 877. The majority dismissed the appeal against Simon J’s refusal of permission to move for judicial review. Rix LJ dissented.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Simon J, 15 November 2007. Permission to move for judicial review was refused because Southwark was entitled to evaluate whether G required accommodation under section 20(1).