Shuttari v The Law Society

Removal from the Roll of Solicitors is justified only where it remains necessary to protect the public or the reputation of the profession. In assessing that necessity, the disciplinary tribunal must consider reliable evidence of subsequent rehabilitation, improved practice management, and safeguards addressing the risk of repetition. A serious disciplinary history and past reckless conduct do not automatically require striking off, particularly where the principal misconduct is historic and arose in exceptional personal circumstances. Appropriate conditions may protect the public while preserving the solicitor’s practice, including supervised practice, exclusion from a particular area of work, and medical monitoring.

The claimant, a solicitor, appealed under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision to strike her name from the Roll and impose costs. The appeal concerned penalty only.

The Tribunal had considered five groups of disciplinary matters, including reckless conduct in a 1991 conveyancing transaction, substantial unpaid counsel’s fees, failures to comply with professional obligations, and repeated failures to respond to correspondence. The claimant relied on her improved health, the transformation of her practice after entering partnership, new management procedures, professional accreditation, and favourable testimonials. The central issue was whether striking her off remained necessary for public protection or the reputation of the profession.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the Tribunal’s order striking the claimant from the Roll.
2. The Tribunal’s reasoning was substantially unimpeachable, but it materially erred in stating that no evidence supported the improvements made to the claimant’s practice after she entered partnership. The evidence showed that new procedures had been introduced, workloads were controlled, and the practice had obtained ISO 9000 accreditation and Law Society accreditation as a provider of continuing professional development.
3. The question was whether removal from the Roll was necessary for public protection or for maintaining the reputation of the solicitors’ profession. On the evidence before the Tribunal and the additional evidence admitted under CPR Part 52.11(2), it was not necessary for either purpose.
4. The 1991 conveyancing conduct was properly characterised as improper and reckless in the extreme. It was nevertheless 16 years old, occurred during exceptional personal difficulties, and arose in an area of practice in which the claimant should not work again. The case turned on its facts and raised no new question of principle. The court referred to Bolton v The Law Society as the established authority on severe disciplinary sanctions, but found it unnecessary to set out the familiar passages.
5. Suspension for a significant period would have had an effect practically equivalent to striking off because of its consequences for the practice and the claimant’s family. The public could instead be protected by strict conditions: practice only in partnership with a solicitor of at least five years’ post-admission experience or in employment; no work in or connected with conveyancing; and an annual medical report, at the claimant’s expense, on her psychiatric condition and general health.
6. Lord Justice Laws agreed that the case was exceptional and that allowing the appeal would not injure the public interest. The appeal was allowed unanimously on the proposed conditions.

• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: The claimant was struck off the Roll of Solicitors and ordered to pay costs of £8,300. The present appeal challenged the striking-off sanction only.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was allowed. The striking-off sanction was quashed and replaced with strict practice conditions.