Wiejak v Olsztyn Circuit Court of Poland

On an appeal under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellate court may reconsider whether the district judge reached the correct conclusion on injustice or oppression, while ordinarily respecting findings of fact made after hearing evidence. The passage of time is relevant, particularly where the requested person left the jurisdiction knowing that proceedings might follow. However, the ordinary hardship of extradition, including separation from a partner and children, does not by itself amount to oppression. The appeal court should not interfere where the district judge’s findings, reasoning and conclusion are properly open to her.

The appellant appealed against District Judge Tubbs’s decision of 5 July 2007 ordering his extradition to Poland under two European arrest warrants. The warrants concerned alleged vehicle-taking in 1998 and burglary in 1999. He relied principally on the lapse of eight or nine years, his family circumstances, employment and establishment in the United Kingdom, submitting that extradition would now be oppressive.

The district judge accepted that the passage of time could be considered, despite findings that the appellant had left Poland knowing of the events and that proceedings might be brought. The central issue was whether, on those findings, extradition would be unjust or oppressive and whether the district judge had reached a conclusion with which the appellate court should interfere.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the district judge’s decision ordering extradition.
2. Under sections 27(2) and (3) of the Extradition Act 2003, an appeal may succeed only if the district judge ought to have decided a question before her differently. The appellate court must consider the district judge’s reasons carefully. It is nevertheless free, and required, to differ from her conclusion if, accepting her findings, the statutory question should have been answered differently.
3. Findings of fact made after hearing evidence should ordinarily be respected. Here, neither party challenged the district judge’s findings. The appellant had left Poland knowing of the events giving rise to the proceedings, and that was a relevant consideration even though he was not a fugitive in the narrowest sense.
4. The offences were old, but the matters relied upon by the appellant did not establish oppression. His changed age and circumstances, stable family life, employment and residence in the United Kingdom, and the distress caused by separation were ordinary consequences of extradition. They could be seriously inconvenient and distressing, but family separation alone could not properly amount to oppression.
5. Mr Justice Nelson concluded that there was no proper basis for interference. Lord Justice Sedley agreed that the appellate court could have allowed the appeal if, accepting the findings, extradition were unjust or oppressive, but he likewise found no basis for differing from the district judge’s findings or conclusions.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal dismissed. The court upheld District Judge Tubbs’s decision of 5 July 2007 ordering extradition under two European arrest warrants.