Versluis v The Public Prosecutor's Office In Zwolle-Lelystad, the Netherlands

[2019] EWHC 764 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2019] EWHC 764 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
28 March 2019
Judgment text

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Subjects
Extradition Human rights Passage of time
Keywords
European arrest warrant fugitive from justice passage of time oppression physical and mental condition prison medical care fresh medical evidence article 8 proportionality sentence enforcement
Outcome
appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A person is a fugitive for the purpose of the passage-of-time bar only if it is proved to the criminal standard that the person knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of legal process. Lawfully remaining in an established country of residence, without taking positive steps to evade arrest, does not suffice.

Extradition is oppressive under sections 14 or 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 only where the resulting hardship exceeds the ordinary consequences of extradition. The assessment is fact-sensitive. In a health case, the court must consider the treatment available in the requesting state and may presume that an EU member state will provide adequate prison medical care, although a complex condition may require more specific information.

Factual background

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a district judge's order for his extradition to the Netherlands. He was wanted to serve 521 days remaining from a 26-month sentence for participation in a criminal organisation and fraud-related offences.

He contended that extradition was barred by the passage of time under section 14, by his physical and mental condition under section 25, and because it would disproportionately interfere with his rights under article 8 of the Convention. The respondent challenged the district judge's finding that he was not a fugitive. The High Court also admitted updated medical evidence and considered whether it altered the position.

Held

  1. The appeal was dismissed. The respondent's challenge to the finding that the appellant was not a fugitive was also rejected.

  2. A person is precluded from relying on section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 where it is proved to the criminal standard that he knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of legal process. The appellant had participated in the Dutch proceedings, personally or through lawyers, and had been free to leave the Netherlands. He had no duty to return voluntarily or co-operate with enforcement. Merely continuing to live lawfully in the United Kingdom, without positive evasion, did not make him a fugitive: Pillar-Neumann [2017] EWHC 3371 (Admin) applied (paras 53–61).

  3. Section 25 was the appropriate starting point because it is the specific provision governing health and extradition. “Unjust” and “oppressive” have the same meanings in sections 14 and 25. Oppression requires more than ordinary hardship and is assessed on the facts, including the medical facilities and safeguards in the requesting state. EU member states are presumed to provide adequate prison medical care, although particularly complex conditions may require specific information or assurances. Parity with United Kingdom treatment is unnecessary (paras 62–65).

  4. The district judge had accurately considered the appellant's cardiac, endocrine, psychological and other conditions. She was entitled to find that the Dutch authorities could provide adequate treatment. Updated evidence disclosed no marked deterioration requiring a different conclusion. The section 25 ground therefore failed (paras 66–82).

  5. For section 14, the passage of time must itself operate upon the requested person's circumstances so as to produce injustice or oppression. Mere hardship is insufficient. Although the relevant period exceeded eight years and included an unexplained five-year delay, the appellant knew that the Netherlands wanted him to serve his sentence. The district judge had considered his deteriorating health, age, the delay and the seriousness of the offences. Her conclusion that the high threshold was not met was not wrong (paras 83–99).

  6. The district judge had properly balanced the public interest in extradition against the appellant's family life, health, residence, delay and other personal circumstances. Her conclusion that extradition was proportionate under article 8 disclosed no error (paras 100–108).

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed. The respondent's challenge to the finding that the appellant was not a fugitive was rejected: [2019] EWHC 764 (Admin).

  2. Westminster Magistrates' Court: District Judge Rose rejected the statutory and Convention objections and ordered extradition on 26 March 2018.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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