Igor Kopan v Regional Court in Czestochowa, Poland

Under Extradition Act 2003, the passage of time bar has no fixed limitation period or automatic cut-off. The court must assess whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive in the circumstances. Culpable and unexplained delay by the requesting state may make extradition oppressive, particularly where the delay is exceptionally long. The assessment also includes changes in the requested person’s circumstances, including serious deterioration in health. Where fresh evidence is admitted on appeal, the appellate court makes its own de novo assessment of the statutory bars on the material as it then stands.

The appellant appealed, with permission, against a district judge’s order at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 13 July 2023 directing his extradition to Poland to face fraud charges concerning alleged offences committed between 2004 and 2006.

He challenged the finding that extradition was not barred by the passage of time under sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, and the finding that extradition was compatible with his Article 8 rights. After the hearing, he produced evidence of a potentially serious cancer diagnosis. The central issue was whether, in light of the unexplained delay and the new medical evidence, extradition would be unjust or oppressive.

1. Appeal allowed. The extradition order was quashed.
2. Because fresh evidence had been admitted, the appellate task was to make an independent de novo assessment on the material as it stood at the time of the appeal. The general appellate question of whether the district judge was wrong therefore did not apply.
3. Sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 contain no statute of limitations and impose no automatic cut-off point. The question is whether, in the particular circumstances, extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time.
4. The distinction identified in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 remained applicable: injustice primarily concerns prejudice to the conduct of the trial, while oppression concerns hardship caused by changes in the accused’s circumstances. The concepts overlap and together address cases where return would be unfair.
5. The requesting state knew in 2007 that the appellant was in the United Kingdom, could have sought his arrest then, issued no warrant until 2022, and gave no explanation for the delay. The nearly 20-year delay was culpable and made extradition oppressive. The appellant’s recent potentially serious cancer diagnosis, likely surgery and chemotherapy supplied an additional reason why extradition would be oppressive.
6. It was unnecessary to determine the Article 8 ground. The appeal was allowed and the order for extradition quashed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On 29 August 2024, the appeal was allowed and the extradition order was quashed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: A district judge ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland on 13 July 2023.