Mickael Hiscox v Public Prosecutor to the Regional Court of Lille, France

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, oppression caused by delay requires more than hardship. The requested person must show a causal link between the passage of time and oppressive effects arising from changed circumstances. The seriousness of the alleged offending remains relevant. Culpable delay by the requesting authority is also relevant, particularly in a borderline case, although it does not by itself make extradition oppressive. A very long delay, for which the requested person is not responsible, combined with substantial and beneficial changes in his life may make extradition oppressive. There is no fixed limitation period or automatic cut-off point.

The appellant challenged a district judge’s order directing his extradition to France. The request relied on a conviction warrant based on a 2004 French default judgment imposing four years’ imprisonment for complicity in importing cocaine in 2001.

The appellant had not participated in the French proceedings and was not alleged to be a fugitive. The issue was whether extradition was barred under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 because of the passage of time. The delay lasted about 20 years, during which the appellant ceased offending, developed health problems and established a settled family life.

1. Appeal allowed. The district judge’s conclusion that extradition would cause hardship but not oppression was wrong. The appellant was ordered to be discharged.
2. Oppression under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 is a high threshold. Hardship alone is insufficient. The requested person must establish a causal connection between the passage of time and oppressive effects arising from changed circumstances. The gravity of the offending must be weighed against those circumstances.
3. The appellant was not a fugitive and bore no responsibility for the delay. The evidence showed that the French judicial authority knew his whereabouts, that amendments to the warrant were not supplied despite repeated requests, and that the appellant was later removed from Interpol circulation. The delay was culpable and attributable to the requesting authority.
4. Culpable delay does not automatically make extradition oppressive, but it is relevant, particularly in a borderline case. The district judge should have considered the National Crime Agency statement as material potentially undermining the respondent’s case.
5. There is no fixed limitation period or automatic cut-off point. However, the 20-year delay, the appellant’s rehabilitation, law-abiding life, health problems, settled family life and justified sense that extradition was not being pursued made extradition oppressive despite the seriousness of the offences.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On appeal from the decision of Clarke DJ dated 28 September 2022, the appeal was allowed and the appellant was discharged.