Surico v Public Prosecutor of the Public Prosecuting Office of Bari, Italy

[2018] EWHC 401 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2018] EWHC 401 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
5 March 2018
Judgment text

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Subjects
Extradition Human rights Appellate review
Keywords
extradition appeal physical or mental condition injustice or oppression passage of time article 8 proportionality prison healthcare panic disorder family life requested person European arrest warrant
Outcome
appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

An extradition appeal concerning proportionality, injustice or oppression is not a rehearing. The High Court asks whether the district judge’s decision was wrong, while respecting findings based on oral evidence.

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, suicide risk is only one possible basis for establishing oppression. Serious deterioration in physical or mental health may suffice, but ordinary stress and hardship do not. The court must consider all relevant circumstances and may ordinarily presume that appropriate prison healthcare will be available in the requesting state.

Passage of time bars extradition only where the delay itself causes the relevant injustice or oppression. Under article 8, the requested person’s private and family life must be balanced against the invariably weighty, but fact-sensitive, public interest in extradition.

Factual background

The appellant challenged a district judge’s order extraditing him to Italy to serve a four-year sentence for sexual offences against a child. Permission to appeal was limited to sections 14, 21 and 25 of the Extradition Act 2003.

The appellant was elderly and had multiple physical conditions and a panic disorder. He contended that delay, separation from family support and the likely deterioration of his health made extradition oppressive and disproportionate under article 8 of the Convention.

The central questions were whether the district judge’s determinations were wrong and whether the appellant’s health, the passage of time or his private and family life required his discharge.

Held

  1. The appeal was dismissed. The statutory appellate question was whether the district judge’s determination was wrong. Extradition appeals are not rehearings or opportunities to reweigh the evidence without regard to the decision below. Findings based on oral evidence should ordinarily be respected. The same approach applies to article 8 proportionality and to statutory bars based on injustice, oppression or the interests of justice: Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin) and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 applied.

  2. Section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 was the appropriate starting point for ill-health because it is the lex specialis. Its controlling test is whether the requested person’s physical or mental condition makes extradition unjust or oppressive. All relevant circumstances must be considered. Ordinary stress and hardship are insufficient, and factual comparisons or supplementary descriptions of the threshold should not displace the statutory language.

  3. The district judge had focused excessively on suicide risk, although the appellant did not advance a freestanding suicide case. Suicide risk is only one way in which section 25 may be engaged. Evidence that extradition may cause a person to become seriously mentally unwell can establish oppression without proof of suicide risk.

  4. That error did not make the decision wrong. The appellant’s physical conditions were controlled by monitoring and medication. Appropriate treatment in Italy could be presumed. His panic disorder had not previously required treatment and was a recognised condition for which medication could be provided if separation from his family caused deterioration. The expert’s doubts about Italian prison provision fell outside his expertise. The section 25 ground therefore failed.

  5. In this conviction case, section 14 concerned oppression since the appellant became unlawfully at large in January 2012. Delay must itself operate upon the requested person’s circumstances so as to cause oppression. The appellant had no false sense of security and knew throughout that his sentence remained enforceable. His only new physical condition was controlled. The section 14 ground failed.

  6. The district judge properly balanced the appellant’s age, health, family support and delay against the seriousness of the offences, the sentence and the strong public interest in extradition. His conclusion that extradition was compatible with article 8 was not wrong. The appellant’s medical notes should, if possible, be translated and accompany him so that the Italian authorities could assess his needs immediately.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the extradition order was dismissed: [2018] EWHC 401 (Admin).
  2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge McPhee ordered the appellant’s extradition to Italy on 6 July 2017.
  3. Permission: Sir Wyn Williams initially refused permission on the papers. Julian Knowles J granted permission following an oral hearing, limited to sections 14, 21 and 25 of the Extradition Act 2003.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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