Dariusz Andrzej Oniszk v Polish Judicial Authority

For the passage-of-time bar to extradition, the court must assess the effect of delay on the requested person’s circumstances. Oppression requires more than the ordinary hardship of extradition. A false sense of security caused by prolonged official inaction may, however, amount to oppression where it has enabled the person’s life and family circumstances to develop on the reasonable expectation that prosecution will not occur. The requested person may rely on delay unless he caused it. Culpable delay by the requesting state is ordinarily unnecessary to establish the bar, but may be decisive in a borderline case. The gravity of the alleged offences and the impact on family members are relevant. The appeal was allowed because the district judge had failed to determine and weigh the appellant’s false sense of security.

The appellant appealed against an order made by District Judge Sternberg in Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 5 August 2022 directing his extradition to Poland on an accusation warrant. Leave to appeal was granted on two grounds: whether extradition was barred by section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 as oppressive by reason of the passage of time, and whether it would disproportionately interfere with Article 8 rights.

The alleged offending occurred between September 2003 and September 2005. The appellant was questioned as a witness in 2006 and 2007, moved openly to the United Kingdom in 2008, and was not arrested until March 2022. The central issue was whether the long period of official inaction had created a false sense of security which, together with the developed circumstances of his life, made extradition oppressive.

1. Appeal allowed; appellant discharged. It was unnecessary to determine the alternative Article 8 ground.
2. Under section 14(a) of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant period ran from the alleged offending, ending on 30 September 2005, to the extradition hearing. The period exceeded 17 years. The focus was the effect of that period and the circumstances of the case.
3. Oppression concerns hardship to the requested person resulting from changes in circumstances during the relevant period. The passage of time must have operated as the cradle of events giving rise to oppression. More than the ordinary hardship of extradition is required, but family impact and the gravity of the alleged offences may be considered.
4. The appellant had co-operated with the investigation by attending two interviews as a witness. He was unaware that he was under investigation until his arrest and received no notice for almost 15 years after the last interview. It was reasonable for him to expect that no proceedings would be brought, and his confidence in that expectation increased over time.
5. By the time his relationship and family life in the United Kingdom developed, the prolonged inaction had already created a strong sense of security. The delay before the decision to prosecute was culpable, and the authorities then failed to act expeditiously after deciding to prosecute. The false sense of security was a powerful consideration, went considerably beyond mere hardship, and amounted to oppression consequent on the passage of time.
6. The district judge was therefore wrong to conclude that section 14 did not bar extradition. The appellant’s developed family life, the seriousness of the allegations and the likely custodial sentence were relevant considerations, but did not displace the section 14 bar.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision was allowed and the appellant was ordered to be discharged.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 5 August 2022 District Judge Sternberg ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland.