Obert v Public Prosecutor's Office of Appeal of Ioannina, Greece

For the passage-of-time bar to extradition, the requested person must show that delay caused injustice or oppression. A generalised complaint about lost evidence is insufficient; the evidential handicap must be particularised. Oppression requires substantially more than ordinary extradition hardship, but prolonged and unexplained delay may create a false sense of security which, in an unusual case, satisfies the test. The seriousness of the alleged offence and the requesting state’s culpability for delay are relevant. A refusal by one Member State to extradite does not itself make a later request to another Member State an abuse of process. Article 3 objections require objective, reliable, specific and current evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of compliance.

The appellant appealed against a District Judge’s order dated 11 August 2016 for his extradition to Greece under an accusation European Arrest Warrant concerning alleged handling of a stolen motor car. The alleged offence dated from April 2002. Greece issued a domestic warrant in 2004 and the European Arrest Warrant in 2014. Italy had refused extradition in 2015 because prosecution there was time-barred.

Before the Administrative Court, the appellant renewed objections based on passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, prison conditions, and abuse of process.

1. Appeal allowed and discharge ordered. The additional statements from the appellant were refused under section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003. They were available at the extradition hearing, no explanation for their omission was given, and there was no other good reason to admit them.
2. Section 14 requires a causal link between the passage of time and the alleged injustice or oppression. A generalised assertion of forensic handicap is insufficient. The appellant must identify the evidence lost or unavailable because of the delay. Here, the unavailable car and any documentation did not establish injustice, and a fair trial process could make appropriate allowance for delay-related difficulties.
3. The oppression limb requires more than ordinary extradition hardship. The prolonged and unexplained inactivity of the Italian and Greek authorities, followed by the appellant’s belief that the matter had ended, created a false sense of security. Together with his new life in the United Kingdom, family responsibilities and the relatively limited seriousness of the alleged offence, that amounted to oppression caused by delay.
4. The court did not separately determine Article 8 because the conclusion under section 14 made a separate proportionality exercise artificial. Italy’s refusal to extradite did not make the United Kingdom proceedings abusive, since it rested on Italian limitation law. The alleged conversation with a Greek consular official also fell well short of an undertaking or of the exacting standard for abuse of process.
5. The Article 3 objection failed. Although conditions at Ioannina were troubling and overcrowding remained significant, the evidence did not rebut the strong presumption that Greece would comply with Article 3. The appeal was allowed on section 14 alone.

• Administrative Court: District Judge Snow ordered extradition on 11 August 2016.
• High Court (Administrative Court): On appeal with permission from Collins J., the court allowed the appeal and ordered the appellant’s discharge under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.