Elis Lila v Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic Attached to the Court of Pesaro, Italian Republic

In extradition appeals concerning conviction warrants, the relevant period under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 begins when the requested person becomes liable to arrest without further order or judicial process. Hardship caused by extradition is insufficient by itself to establish oppression. The court must assess the whole circumstances, including the seriousness of the offending, the sentence remaining, the requested person’s knowledge of the risk of enforcement, and changes in personal and family life.

Under article 8, the best interests of affected children are a primary consideration, but may be outweighed by the public interest in extradition. Fresh evidence on appeal must be genuinely new and decisive. An error in an aggregate sentence does not constitute abuse of process without cogent evidence of deliberate disregard of speciality rights or resulting prejudice.

The appellant appealed against orders of the Westminster Magistrates’ Court requiring his surrender to Italy under EAW4, EAW5 and TACA1 to serve aggregated custodial sentences. He challenged the orders under sections 14 and 21 of the Extradition Act 2003, relying on the passage of time, oppression, and incompatibility with article 8 of the ECHR.

He also sought permission on further grounds concerning section 20 and alleged abuse of process because TACA1 included a sentence associated with EAW1, from which he had previously been discharged. The respondent conceded that extradition under EAW2 was barred by section 20(5) and (7). The central issues were whether the remaining extraditions were barred by passage of time or article 8, whether fresh evidence should be admitted, and whether TACA1 constituted an abuse of process.

1. Disposition. Permission to appeal was granted in relation to EAW2 and that appeal was allowed by consent. The appellant was discharged in respect of EAW2 under section 20(7) of the Extradition Act 2003. The remaining appeals and the renewed abuse-of-process permission application were dismissed.
2. Section 14. For conviction warrants, time begins when the person becomes liable to arrest without further order or judicial process. On the evidence, that occurred on 24 November 2016, when the Italian enforcement order was issued. The earlier date asserted by the appellant was unsupported by the evidence and inconsistent with his subsequent ability to return temporarily to Italy.
3. The appellant had not been lulled into a false sense of security. He knew of the outstanding sentence and continued, through his Italian lawyer, to challenge enforcement and seek reductions. The delay was substantially explained by those proceedings. Although extradition would cause financial and emotional hardship, hardship alone was insufficient. The seriousness of the offending, the lengthy sentence and the appellant’s knowledge of the enforcement risk justified the conclusion that extradition was not oppressive.
4. Article 8. The children’s best interests were a primary consideration, and the impact on them and the appellant’s family was substantial. Nevertheless, the public interest in extradition remained very weighty because the offending was serious and sustained and a lengthy sentence remained to be served. The appellant’s wife was not the sole carer before his departure to the UK and had demonstrated resilience and capacity to cope. The district judges’ proportionality conclusions were not wrong.
5. Fresh evidence. The additional evidence substantially repeated material already before the district judges. Applying Hungary v Fenyvesi, it was not decisive and was refused.
6. Abuse of process. The inclusion of the EAW1 sentence in the aggregate order was found to be an error, not deliberate bad faith. The Italian authority was required to respect speciality under article 625 of the Trade and Co-operation Agreement and had power to correct the error. Cogent evidence of deliberate usurpation of the statutory extradition scheme or resulting prejudice was absent.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Griffiths ordered extradition in respect of EAW2, EAW4 and EAW5 on 1 September 2021, while discharging the appellant in respect of EAW1 and EAW3.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Snow ordered extradition under TACA1 on 14 May 2024.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was allowed and the appellant discharged in respect of EAW2. The remaining appeals were dismissed.