Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski & Ors

In extradition proceedings, Article 8 requires the court to balance interference with private and family life against the constant and weighty public interest in extradition. That public interest includes honouring extradition arrangements and preventing the United Kingdom from becoming a safe haven for fugitives. Its weight varies with the nature and seriousness of the offending.

The judge should identify the factors on each side in a balance sheet and give a reasoned conclusion. Mutual confidence requires proper respect for the requesting state’s prosecution and sentencing decisions.

On appeal, the court reviews whether the district judge’s decision was wrong. It does not conduct a fresh proportionality assessment, and errors in the reasons do not necessarily establish that the outcome was wrong.

Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski & Ors [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) comprised several extradition appeals heard together because they raised recurring issues concerning Article 8 proportionality under the Extradition Act 2003. The proceedings included appeals by requesting judicial authorities and requested persons arising from European arrest warrants issued by Poland and Slovakia.

The court also considered a renewed application for permission to seek judicial review concerning extradition from the Isle of Man under the Extradition Act 1989. Further issues concerned the effect of a trafficking determination by the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre and the permitted considerations under section 21A of the 2003 Act.

The common questions were how district judges should conduct the Article 8 balance and how an appellate court should review their proportionality decisions.

1. Disposition. The Polish authority’s appeal concerning Celinski’s first two warrants was allowed, the discharge was quashed and the matter was remitted with a section 29(5)(C) direction. Celinski’s appeal concerning the third warrant was dismissed. The Slovakian authority’s appeal concerning Cambal was allowed and remitted. Ciemiega’s appeal was dismissed, and Inglot’s renewed application for permission to seek judicial review was refused. The Polish authority’s appeal concerning Pawelec was allowed and remitted. Nida’s Article 8 challenge failed on the substantive balance, but the court requested further submissions about the very short period potentially remaining on his sentence.
2. Article 8 proportionality. The principles in Norris v Government of the USA (No.2) [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 required the interference with private and family life to be weighed against the constant and weighty public interest in extradition. Judges must expressly consider the importance of honouring extradition arrangements and preventing the United Kingdom from becoming a safe haven. The weight of the public interest varies with the seriousness of the offending.
3. A judge should find the facts, list the considerations favouring and opposing extradition in a balance sheet, and explain the resulting balance. In EU cases, mutual confidence and respect require proper weight to be given to the requesting judicial authority’s decisions. A requested court should not substitute its own views about prosecution, sentencing policy or the appropriate sentence. Following a foreign conviction, it should ordinarily assume, absent very cogent evidence, that the sentence reflects the gravity of the offending as assessed by the court possessing the relevant information.
4. Appellate review. Applying the approach in Re B (A Child) (FC) [2013] UKSC 33, the single question was whether the district judge’s proportionality decision was wrong. The appellate court does not make a fresh determination. Findings of fact, particularly those based on oral evidence, must ordinarily be respected. Errors or omissions in the district judge’s reasons do not by themselves establish that the decision was wrong; the focus remains on the outcome.
5. Subsidiary issues. Neither the trafficking Convention nor the EU Directive created a bar to extradition. A trafficking decision by the competent authority was not binding on the district judge, who had to determine the issue from the evidence. Hearings should not ordinarily be adjourned or their outcome deferred for a competent-authority referral. Section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003 had a narrow scope: only seriousness, likely penalty and the possibility of less coercive measures could be considered. Pawelec’s discharge was erroneous because the district judge had considered delay and conduct in the United Kingdom for purposes outside those statutory criteria.

1. High Court, Administrative Court: In Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski & Ors [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the requesting-authority appeals concerning Celinski, Cambal and Pawelec were allowed, with remittals where required. Celinski’s appeal on his third warrant and Ciemiega’s appeal were dismissed. Inglot’s renewed permission application was refused. Nida’s substantive Article 8 challenge failed, subject to further submissions on the sentence remaining.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District judges had discharged Celinski on two warrants, Cambal and Pawelec, but had ordered extradition in Celinski’s third case and in the cases of Nida and Ciemiega.
3. Judicial review: A district judge ordered Inglot’s extradition under the Extradition Act 1989, and the Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant. A single judge refused permission to seek judicial review before the renewed application to the Divisional Court.