Gheorghe Girboiu v Vrancea Tribunal, Romania

On a statutory extradition appeal, an arrest warrant must be read as a whole. It need not provide exhaustive particulars, but must give enough information for each offence to be identified, the alleged conduct understood, dual criminality assessed and any extradition bar considered. Legal provisions incorporated by cross-reference may supply relevant context. The court examines the conduct alleged, rather than matching foreign and domestic offence elements. Where English law requires dishonesty, that mental element may be inferred where the warrant makes it the only reasonable or impelled inference. A person who knowingly leaves the jurisdiction while aware of criminal proceedings may deliberately waive attendance at trial. In the Article 8 balance, fugitive status attenuates delay’s weight, while a child’s best interests remain a primary consideration.

The appellant appealed from District Judge King’s order of 7 May 2025 requiring his extradition to Romania under two conviction warrants issued pursuant to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The warrants concerned four offences and remaining custodial sentences. Permission to appeal was granted on challenges concerning the particulars in the warrants and dual criminality. Permission was refused on challenges concerning deliberate absence from trial and European Convention on Human Rights article 8, but those grounds were renewed. The appellant also sought to adduce fresh evidence about the effect of extradition on his partner and a child in their care. The central issues were whether the warrants satisfied the Extradition Act 2003, whether the section 20 bar applied, and whether extradition would be disproportionate.

Appeal dismissed. Grounds (1) and (2) were rejected. Permission was refused on renewed grounds (3) and (4), and the application to admit fresh evidence was refused.

1. The appellate court applied the statutory approach described in Love v United States of America [2018] 1 WLR 2889 and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2016] 1 WLR 551. The question was whether the extradition judge’s decision was wrong. The appeal was not a rehearing or an invitation to reweigh the evidence afresh, and factual findings made after hearing evidence ordinarily required respect.
2. For the purposes of sections 2(6)(b), 10 and 65 of the Extradition Act 2003, the warrants had to be read as a whole. They did not require exhaustive particularisation, but had to provide sufficient information to identify each offence, explain the alleged conduct, permit the transposition exercise and allow relevant bars to be considered. The cross-referenced Romanian provisions formed part of the descriptions. Applying the conduct test from Norris v United States of America [2008] 1 AC 920 and Cleveland v United States of America [2019] 1 WLR 4392, the conduct in all four offences could constitute offences under English law. Although a dishonoured cheque alone would not establish fraud, the warrants, read with the Romanian offence provisions, made dishonest intent the impelled inference.
3. For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellant was treated as present at the AW1 trial because he had instructed a lawyer to represent him and the warrant contained no ambiguity or confusion. That followed Cretu v Romania [2016] 1 WLR 3344 and Merticariu v Romania [2024] 1 WLR 1506. As to AW2, actual knowledge that the trial would proceed in absence was not essential. By knowingly and intelligently leaving Romania while aware of the criminal proceedings, the appellant had unequivocally waived his right to be present, applying Bertino v Italy [2024] 1 WLR 1483.
4. In the article 8 proportionality assessment, the unexplained delay after the 2017 discharge diminished the public interest and increased the impact on private and family life, but the appellant’s fugitive status attenuated the weight of delay. The seriousness of the offences, the substantial remaining sentences and the public interest in honouring extradition obligations remained weighty factors. The child’s best interests were a primary consideration, but the alleged impact required evidential support. The evidence did not establish an exceptionally severe effect on the child’s welfare, and the fresh material about the partner’s fostering role did not make extradition disproportionate.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Johnson J granted permission on grounds (1) and (2) and refused permission on grounds (3) and (4) on 5 January 2026. Mr Justice Mould dismissed the appeal, refused renewed permission on grounds (3) and (4), and refused the fresh-evidence application.
2. District Judge: On 7 May 2025 District Judge King ordered extradition to Romania, having found the warrants valid, the offences extradition offences, no statutory bar applicable, and extradition compatible with article 8.