Piotr Zebracki v Regional Court in Torun, Poland

An accused person may later handle goods which he previously stole. The question under section 22 of the Theft Act 1968 is whether the handling occurred otherwise than in the course of stealing. A thief may become a receiver after the stealing has ended, including on the following day.

For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate absence requires an unequivocal waiver of the right to attend trial. The court must consider awareness of the criminal proceedings and charges, together with an intention not to participate or to escape prosecution.

Fugitive status does not end merely because the requesting state learns the person’s whereabouts or because he is arrested. Article 8 will rarely outweigh the strong public interest in extradition, particularly where the requested person deliberately evaded justice.

The appellant appealed against an extradition order made by District Judge Tempia at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 28 October 2024. Poland sought his surrender under a conviction warrant to enforce an aggregated sentence, with 207 days remaining, for ten offences committed between 2012 and 2015.

Permission to appeal was granted on grounds under sections 10 and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, section 20, and article 8 of the ECHR. The issues concerned dual criminality, deliberate absence from trial, the effect of delay and fugitivity, and proportionality under article 8.

1. Section 10 and dual criminality. The conduct test is concerned with whether the conduct alleged would constitute an offence in the relevant part of the United Kingdom. Under section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968, receiving stolen goods is an offence where the receiving occurs otherwise than in the course of stealing. That phrase does not mean otherwise than having stolen. The course of stealing includes the appropriation and a limited period for making off with the goods, but ordinarily ends before the following day. A person may therefore steal goods on one day and receive the same goods later. The section 10 objection failed.
2. Section 20 and absence from trial. Article 4a of the Framework Decision, and materially identical Article 601(1)(i) of the TACA, support reliance on the warrant unless there is ambiguity, confusion or abuse of process. The warrant was sufficiently clear. Alternatively, applying Bertino and Mohammed, the appellant knew of the criminal proceedings and charges, and his failure to collect the summons at his nominated address, failure to notify a change of address, and wider conduct established an intention to evade the proceedings. The section 20 objection failed.
3. Section 14 and fugitivity. Fugitivity is fact-sensitive and concerns knowingly placing oneself beyond the reach of the requesting state’s legal process. It does not end because the person is arrested, the requesting state discovers his whereabouts, or sentences are later aggregated at his request. The appellant remained a fugitive. No exceptional circumstances or oppression were established. The unexplained delay did not satisfy section 14.
4. Article 8. The court applied the appellate approach in Celinski. The bare possibility of early release in Poland carried little weight under Andrysiewicz, and the rare-case conditions were not met. The unexplained NCA delay was relevant to the article 8 balance, but the appellant’s fugitive conduct, the seriousness and persistence of the offending, the remaining sentence and the strong public interest in extradition outweighed the family and private-life interference. The decision below was not wrong.
5. Disposal. All four grounds failed. The appeal was dismissed.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal against the extradition order made by District Judge Tempia at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 28 October 2024. The appeal was dismissed.