Stryjecki v District Court In Lublin, Poland

A person subject to a suspended sentence is a fugitive for passage-of-time purposes where he knowingly breaches conditions intended to keep him within reach of the sentencing authorities. Subsequent official delay does not ordinarily alter that status.

A person tried in his absence has not deliberately absented himself unless the issuing authority proves the statutory notification requirements to the criminal standard. Domestic compliance with rules of service does not by itself establish actual receipt of the trial information.

In assessing proportionality under article 8, prolonged and unexplained official delay may substantially reduce the public interest in extradition and increase the weight attached to an established private and family life.

The appellant challenged a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Poland under two conviction European Arrest Warrants. EAW1 concerned a theft conviction and sentence imposed in his absence. EAW2 concerned a suspended sentence for commercial burglary which was later activated.

The appeal raised three issues: whether passage of time barred extradition under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003; whether the appellant deliberately absented himself from the EAW1 trial for the purposes of section 20; and whether extradition would disproportionately interfere with private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. The appeal was allowed in respect of both warrants. The appellant was discharged under section 20(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 in respect of EAW1. Extradition under EAW2 would be disproportionate under article 8.

2. The section 14 ground failed. A person who voluntarily leaves the jurisdiction, knowingly prevents himself from performing the obligations of a suspended sentence and knows that the sentence may consequently be activated cannot rely on the resulting passage of time. The appellant knowingly ceased contact with his probation officer and failed to notify changes of address. He was therefore a fugitive to the criminal standard for almost the whole relevant period. Official inaction, including a failure to locate him, did not alter that status.

3. The District Judge erred in finding that the appellant deliberately absented himself from the EAW1 trial. Section 20 had to be interpreted consistently with article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision. The issuing authority had to establish to the criminal standard that the appellant was personally summoned or actually received unequivocal official information about the scheduled time and place of trial, and was informed that a decision might be made in his absence. Compliance with domestic rules governing service was insufficient without proof of actual receipt.

4. The warrant was incomplete and ambiguous. The further information merely stated that the appellant had been properly notified. It did not establish personal service, actual receipt, or notification that judgment might be given in his absence. His failure to maintain contact and the resulting difficulty in serving him did not, without more, establish deliberate absence. Nor was the court satisfied that his lack of awareness resulted from a manifest lack of diligence sufficient to protect his rights of defence.

5. No evidence established an entitlement to a retrial or a review amounting to a retrial. The burden remained on the judicial authority and could not be satisfied merely by Poland’s adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights. Discharge under section 20(7) was therefore required for EAW1.

6. For EAW2, the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements remained strong, and the offence was not trivial. Nevertheless, the offence had occurred 18 years earlier when the appellant was 17. The authorities knew for nearly nine years that he was in England but made no apparent effort to locate him before issuing EAW2. That culpable and unexplained delay dramatically reduced the public-interest weight and allowed the appellant to consolidate a family life in the United Kingdom. Its impact on his wife and children made extradition disproportionate.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the appeal in respect of both European Arrest Warrants. It discharged the appellant on EAW1 under section 20(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 and held extradition on EAW2 disproportionate under article 8.

2. District Judge: District Judge Zani ordered extradition on 19 August 2016. Dingemans J granted permission to appeal at an oral hearing on 25 October 2016.