Tibor Jozsa v Tribunal of Szekesfehervar, Hungary

In an extradition appeal based on changed circumstances or fresh evidence, the appellate court must make its own de novo assessment of Article 8 proportionality on the material currently available. The court should use a structured balance-sheet approach, identifying the factors for and against extradition and giving reasons for the result. Strong weight attaches to honouring extradition arrangements, preventing safe havens, the seriousness of the offending, fugitivity and respect for the requesting state’s sentence. Family life, mental health, delay, time already served, possible release and curfew may be relevant, but none necessarily makes extradition disproportionate. Extradition will ordinarily be barred only where its impact on private and family life is exceptionally severe.

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Goozée on 20 November 2019 for his extradition to Hungary to serve a sentence for assault. He relied on section 20, Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The earlier grounds were resolved or fell away, and the remaining issue was whether extradition was barred by section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 as a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.

Since the District Judge’s decision, a second European arrest warrant had been withdrawn. The appellant had spent eight months on remand in the United Kingdom, remained subject to a night-time electronic curfew, and might be eligible to seek parole in Hungary. The central issue was whether those changed circumstances required extradition to be refused.

Appeal dismissed.

1. Under section 27(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, the appeal could succeed only if the appellant should have been discharged under Article 8. Although the ordinary appellate question is whether the lower court was wrong, the changed circumstances and fresh evidence required a de novo assessment on the material then available. It was unnecessary to speculate about what the District Judge would have decided in 2019.
2. The Article 8 question was whether the interference with private and family life was outweighed by the public interest in extradition. The court applied the principles in Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] 2 AC 487 and H(H) v Italy Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2013] 1 AC 338. The public interest was weighty and would ordinarily prevail unless the consequences were exceptionally severe.
3. Following the structured approach in Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2016] 1 WLR 551, the court identified the factors favouring extradition and those against it before balancing them. The factors favouring extradition included the United Kingdom’s treaty obligations, the appellant’s fugitivity, the seriousness of the assault, the sentence remaining, and his other offending. The opposing factors included family life, mental health, delay, time served and the possibility of parole.
4. Four months remaining to serve did not substantially diminish the public interest in extradition. The authorities showed no inherent disproportionality in surrender to serve weeks rather than months, and the United Kingdom court should not second-guess the requesting state’s sentence or release regime. Possible parole was only a possibility. Jesionowski [2014] EWHC 319 (Admin) was distinguishable because immediate release there was irresistibly required by the requesting state’s provisions. The curfew could be relevant, as recognised in Hojden v District Court, Gorzow, Wielkopolski, Poland [2022] EWHC 2725, but there was no evidence of particular impact on work or family life.
5. Taking all matters together, the impact on the appellant’s Article 8 rights was not exceptionally severe. Extradition was proportionate and the appeal was dismissed.

• District Judge Goozée: ordered the appellant’s extradition to Hungary on 20 November 2019.
• High Court (Administrative Court): granted permission to appeal, conducted a de novo Article 8 assessment because circumstances had changed, and dismissed the appeal.