Ostrzycki v Regional Court of Suwalki, Poland

For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, a person convicted in absence may be treated as having deliberately absented himself where the requesting state took steps normally sufficient under its law to notify him of the trial, but his own conduct prevented service. A failure to reproduce article 4a of the Framework Decision verbatim does not conclusively determine the issue.

Under section 21, the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements remains significant where a serious offence and custodial sentence are involved. A short period remaining to serve, family life established in the United Kingdom, pandemic-related travel difficulties and weak new medical evidence did not make extradition disproportionate.

The appellant appealed against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order for his extradition to Poland to serve an 18-month sentence for an assault causing permanent loss of sight in the victim’s left eye.

The district judge found that the appellant had been convicted in his absence, had deliberately absented himself from the retrial, and was therefore not protected by section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003. The judge also held that extradition was compatible with article 8 of the Convention. The appeal concerned deliberate absence, proportionality, fresh evidence and the effect of time already served.

Appeal dismissed.

1. Section 20. Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 had to be interpreted in the light of article 4a of the European Council Framework Decision 2005/584/JHA as amended. “Trial” meant the trial resulting in the decision, rather than the prosecution process generally. A person could be treated as deliberately absent even without actual knowledge of the hearing date where the state had diligently taken steps that would normally notify a non-evasive accused and the accused’s own conduct prevented service.
2. The Polish authorities had served notice at the appellant’s last known address. He knew of a duty to notify the authorities of a change of address, but failed to do so after moving to the United Kingdom. The district judge was entitled to find that this conduct prevented service and that extradition was not barred by section 20.
3. Article 8. The question on appeal was whether the district judge’s proportionality assessment was wrong. The serious offence, the 18-month sentence and the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements remained significant. The fact that four months remained to be served was only one factor and did not alter the balance. The case was materially different from Wysocki v Polish Judicial Authority, where the sentence would effectively have been completed.
4. The appellant had established family life in the United Kingdom while aware that Polish proceedings continued. The district judge was entitled to treat that circumstance, together with the family impact, as insufficient to outweigh the public interest. Possible delays in arranging transport during the coronavirus pandemic did not make the decision wrong.
5. The further evidence was considered under section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003. Although the material was assumed to be unavailable earlier, it contained no formal diagnosis, prognosis, treatment or meaningful assessment of impact. It could not realistically have changed the proportionality conclusion.
6. The appellant’s deliberate absence meant that the in absentia trial did not undermine the public interest in extradition or establish a breach of article 6. The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order remained in force.

1. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 1 July 2019, District Judge Goldspring ordered extradition to Poland under the Extradition Act 2003.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order upheld.