L, R (on the application of) v Nottinghamshire County Council

Accommodation provided by a local authority may fall within section 20 of the Children Act 1989 even where the authority describes it as assistance under section 17. The authority’s label and the child’s wishes are not determinative. The question is whether, on the facts, the child appeared to require accommodation and whether one of the statutory conditions applied. A person may be “prevented” from providing suitable accommodation or care through the force of circumstances, including a complete breakdown in the relationship between parent and child. A local authority can reduce uncertainty by carrying out an appropriate assessment before deciding whether the child requires accommodation or merely help with accommodation.

The claimant had previously been accommodated by Nottinghamshire County Council under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. In September 2005, after being excluded from her mother’s home, she was placed in bed-and-breakfast accommodation for six or seven days. The Council treated the arrangement as assistance under section 17.

The claimant sought declarations and mandatory orders on the basis that the accommodation was provided under section 20, making her an eligible and then relevant child, and subsequently a former relevant child. The central issues were whether she appeared to require accommodation and whether her mother had been prevented from providing suitable accommodation or care.

1. The claim succeeded. The court declared that the claimant was a former relevant child and ordered the Council to assess her needs, prepare a pathway plan under regulation 8 of the Children Leaving Care Regulations 2001, and appoint a personal adviser.
2. The classification used by the Council was not conclusive. Whether accommodation was provided under section 17 or section 20 depended on the substance of what occurred. The presence of parents did not exclude section 20 accommodation, and section 17 could in an appropriate case assist a lone child who required only help with accommodation.
3. The requirements of section 20 were satisfied. The claimant was a child in need in the Council’s area, appeared to require accommodation, and came within section 20(1)(c). The contemporaneous notes showed that her mother had refused to have her back after an assault and a serious breakdown in their relationship.
4. “Prevented” involved an objective assessment of the circumstances. It was not confined to physical or permanent prevention. A parent may be prevented from providing accommodation or care where the relationship has broken down so completely that the parties cannot reasonably live together. The court preferred the approach of Stanley Burnton J in Sutton to the narrower observations of Lloyd LJ in Hammersmith and Fulham.
5. The Council’s previous attempts to accommodate the claimant did not prevent her from appearing to require accommodation in September 2005. Nor did the absence of a formal assessment alter the statutory question, although an assessment could assist a local authority in distinguishing a need for accommodation from a need for financial or other assistance.
6. Delay did not justify refusing relief. Permission had already been granted, the duty was ongoing, and the contemporaneous records supplied sufficient evidence. The Council was ordered to appoint a personal adviser within one week and to complete the assessment and pathway plan within eight weeks. Costs followed the event.

First-instance judicial review decision. No prior appellate decision in the same litigation was stated.