Thorner v Curtis & Ors

Proprietary estoppel does not require an express promise, including where the claim restricts testamentary freedom. An assurance may arise from words, conduct, implication or silence, provided the claimant reasonably relies on it to his detriment. The court must assess assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability together, looking at the circumstances in the round. Where the assurance is indirect, clear and substantial detrimental reliance, and corroboration where available, become especially important. If an equity arises, relief should satisfy the claimant’s minimum equity and remain proportionate to the expectation and detriment. The court may fulfil the expectation where that is just, but may grant more limited relief where fulfilment would be disproportionate.

David Thorner claimed a proprietary estoppel against the estate of his cousin, Jesse Peter Thorner. He contended that Peter had encouraged his expectation that he would inherit Steart Farm, and that he had relied on that expectation by providing extensive unpaid work and care over many years.

Peter had destroyed a 1997 will leaving the residue of his estate to David. The estate therefore passed under the Intestacy Rules, subject to David’s claim. The defendants disputed assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability, and argued that any equity should be satisfied by a monetary award rather than by transferring the farm. The central issues were whether Peter’s indirect words and conduct were sufficient to found an estoppel and, if so, the appropriate relief.

1. Claim succeeded. The court held that an express promise in precise terms is not an absolute requirement for proprietary estoppel. An assurance may be made expressly or arise by implication from words, conduct or silence. The court must avoid being confined by semantics and must assess whether the relevant conduct encouraged an expectation which it would be unconscionable to disappoint.
2. The elements of the doctrine are not watertight compartments. Assurance, reliance and detriment inform one another, and the court must make a broad inquiry into the circumstances as a whole. Where assurances fall materially short of express promises, the claimant must ordinarily show clear and substantial detrimental reliance. Corroborative evidence may also assist in establishing the meaning and intention attributed to the assurance.
3. It was unnecessary for the assurances to be the sole inducement for David’s conduct. It was sufficient that they were an inducement. The court found a sufficient link between Peter’s encouragement and David’s continued, extensive and unpaid work at Steart Farm.
4. The court found that Peter’s words and conduct created an estoppel. David had reasonably expected to inherit at least Steart Farm, had given up other opportunities, and had devoted extraordinary time and effort to the farm and to Peter without remuneration. It would be grossly unconscionable for the intestacy position to stand.
5. Relief had to represent the minimum equity necessary to do justice and avoid a disproportionate result. Fulfilment of David’s expectation in relation to the agricultural land, buildings, stock and chattels of Steart Farm was not disproportionate, given the nature and duration of his contribution and its importance to the farm’s survival. It would, however, be disproportionate for him also to receive Peter’s non-agricultural assets. Appropriate declarations and consequential relief were to be made accordingly.

First-instance decision. No earlier appellate decision is stated in the judgment.