Thorner v Major & Ors

Proprietary estoppel claims based on an expected testamentary inheritance require a clear and unequivocal representation that is intended to be relied on, or reasonably understood as intended to be relied on. The representation may arise from words, conduct, or both. An informal statement of present testamentary intention is insufficient if it does not amount to a promise or assurance. Because proprietary estoppel can make an intended testamentary disposition effectively irrevocable, the established requirements must be applied with particular care. Indirect statements and conduct, although consistent with an intention that the claimant should inherit, did not establish the necessary representation or intended reliance. The claim therefore failed.

David Thorner claimed that the intestate estate of his late relative, Peter Thorner, was bound by proprietary estoppel to transfer Steart Farm and associated agricultural assets to him. David had provided extensive unpaid assistance to Peter and relied principally on a 1990 incident involving a life-policy bonus notice and later indirect remarks. The judge, Mr John Randall QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge in the Chancery Division, upheld the claim and ordered that the farm and related assets be transferred to David: [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch).

The defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the representations, reliance and detriment, and the proportionality of the remedy. The central issue was whether Peter’s indirect words and conduct amounted to a clear promise or assurance, intended to be relied on, that David would inherit the farm.

1. Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal held that the judge’s findings established Peter’s intention that David should inherit, but intention alone could not create a proprietary estoppel.
2. In an inheritance case, the representation may be made by words, conduct, or both. It must nevertheless be clear and unequivocal. It must be intended to be relied on, or made in circumstances in which it may reasonably be taken as intended to be relied on. The court must distinguish a promise about what the owner will do by will from a statement merely informing another person of current testamentary intentions.
3. The requirements require careful application because a proprietary estoppel may give the claimant a stronger right than a beneficiary under a revocable will. Otherwise the doctrine could undermine the formal requirements of the Wills Act and freedom of testamentary disposition.
4. The 1990 incident, in which Peter handed David a life-policy bonus notice and referred to death duties, was at most an indirect indication from which an intention to leave the farm could be inferred. The later comments were of the same character. They supported the finding that Peter intended David to inherit, but did not make the representation clear and unequivocal or show that it was intended to be relied on.
5. David’s continuation of his extensive unpaid assistance could in principle amount to reliance, even though it began before the representation, if he would not have continued had the representation not been made or had it later been withdrawn. That did not cure the absence of the necessary representation and intended reliance here. The court therefore allowed the appeal. It did not determine the separate challenge to the proportionality of the award.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the defendants’ appeal and held that the proprietary estoppel claim should not have been upheld.
• High Court, Chancery Division, Mr John Randall QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge, upheld David Thorner’s claim and ordered transfer of Steart Farm and related agricultural assets: [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch).