Ottey v Grundy

Proprietary estoppel may arise where an assurance about property induces conduct causing detriment, even in a quasi-matrimonial relationship. The assurance need not be the sole inducement, and reliance may be tested by asking what the claimant would have done if the assurance had been withdrawn. Once reliance is established, the burden shifts to the promisor to disprove the causal connection. Relief is not automatically the fulfilment of the claimant’s expectation. It must be proportionate to the detriment and limited to what is necessary to avoid unconscionable conduct. A promise made in a relationship may be conditional on the parties remaining together, expressly or by implication, but that is a question of fact.

Mark Grundy, executor of Timothy Andreae’s estate, appealed against a proprietary estoppel award made in favour of Dorothy Ottey. Ms Ottey cross-appealed, seeking fuller enforcement of assurances concerning a Jamaican apartment and a life interest in a Chelsea houseboat.

The parties had lived together in a quasi-matrimonial relationship. Ms Ottey cared for Mr Andreae, who had a serious alcohol problem, and interrupted her acting and modelling career. The trial judge found an express promise, detriment and reliance, but awarded £50,000 together with a further £50,000 if the apartment was not transferred. He rejected Ms Ottey’s separate claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

The central issues were whether the promise was conditional on continuation of the relationship, whether sufficient detriment and reliance were established, and whether the relief was proportionate.

1. Both appeal and cross-appeal dismissed. The trial judge’s primary finding that an express promise had been made was not open to challenge. The reference in his assessment of relief to an assumption that the parties would remain together did not make the promise conditional. Conditionality could exist expressly or by implication, but it was a factual issue that had not been investigated at trial.
2. Proprietary estoppel is governed by the broad question whether it would be unconscionable for the maker of an assurance to resile from it. The elements are not watertight compartments and must be considered in the round. Detriment need not be purely financial, and conduct may involve both benefit and detriment. The judge was entitled to find that caring for Mr Andreae and interrupting Ms Ottey’s career went beyond the ordinary incidents of their relationship.
3. The relevant reliance question was what Ms Ottey would have done if the promise had been withdrawn, rather than what she did when it was made. Once the promise and conduct from which inducement could be inferred were shown, the burden shifted to the estate to disprove reliance and causation. The judge was entitled to find that this burden was not discharged.
4. Relief must be no more than necessary to protect against unconscionable conduct and must be proportionate to the detriment. A specific assurance may be a starting point, but it does not invariably require literal enforcement. The trial judge was entitled to treat the expectation of living together for the parties’ joint lives, the subsequent separation, the duration of the detriment, and the disproportion between expectation and detriment as relevant factors. The proprietary estoppel award was distinct from the rejected statutory claim, because post-separation conduct relevant to that claim could not determine whether the equity arose.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2003] EWCA Civ 1176: dismissed the executor’s appeal against the proprietary estoppel award and dismissed Ms Ottey’s cross-appeal seeking fuller relief.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: His Honour Judge Langan QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, found proprietary estoppel established and ordered payment of £50,000, with a further £50,000 payable if the Jamaican apartment was not transferred. The separate claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 failed.