Raissi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An ex gratia compensation scheme for wrongful detention is a ministerial policy, not legislation. It applies only where detention follows a wrongful domestic conviction or charge and exceptional circumstances justify payment. Extradition proceedings do not constitute a charge within the scheme merely because they share features with domestic criminal proceedings. The court must identify the minister’s intention from the policy’s words and context, allowing the minister a reasonable range of meaning. Complete exoneration requires facts establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the claimant did not commit the offence; failure to establish a prima facie case is insufficient. Judicial intervention is highly restrained, particularly in assessing whether circumstances are exceptional or whether payment should be made.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Home Secretary’s refusal to make an ex gratia compensation payment. He had been detained for approximately four and a half months during unsuccessful extradition proceedings initiated by the United States. The extradition accusations concerned alleged false statements in applications relating to his pilot’s licence. During the proceedings, allegations were also made linking him to the 11 September attacks, but no supporting evidence was produced.

The claimant argued that the scheme covered extradition proceedings, that he had been completely exonerated, and that the circumstances were otherwise exceptional. The central issues were whether the scheme required detention following a wrongful domestic conviction or charge, whether extradition conduct was a charge for that purpose, and whether the Home Secretary’s decision was unlawful or irrational.

1. The claim was dismissed. The ex gratia scheme is a ministerial statement of policy directed to discretionary payments from public funds. It is not a statute. The court should determine the minister’s intention from the ordinary meaning of the words used in their context, allowing a reasonable range of meaning. The court should intervene only where the minister’s interpretation falls outside that range, or where the decision is irrational, procedurally unfair or otherwise unlawful.
2. The scheme contains one overarching requirement: detention in custody following a wrongful conviction or charge, together with exceptional circumstances warranting payment. Serious default and complete exoneration are examples of exceptional circumstances, not free-standing alternatives to the requirement of a wrongful conviction or charge.
3. Extradition proceedings did not amount to a charge within the scheme. The similarities between extradition and domestic criminal proceedings, and the informal use of the word charge, could not displace the relevant ministerial intention. In extradition proceedings, the requesting state determines the request, the allegations and their evidential basis. The scheme would not ordinarily be understood to extend to matters outside the responsibility and control of United Kingdom authorities.
4. The claimant had not been completely exonerated. Complete exoneration requires facts establishing beyond reasonable doubt, or conclusively, that the accused did not commit the offence. Discharge because the evidential or legal requirements for extradition were not met, and absence of evidence supporting an allegation, did not satisfy that high threshold.
5. The material before the Home Secretary did not establish serious default or abuse of process by the Crown Prosecution Service. In extradition proceedings the CPS ordinarily acts as lawyer for the requesting state, although its duties to the court and issues concerning liberty may require independent consideration in an appropriate case.
6. Because the detention arose from extradition proceedings and did not follow a wrongful conviction or charge within the scheme, the Home Secretary was not required to consider whether the circumstances justified payment under the scheme. The alternative challenge based on irrationality therefore failed.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim. The judgment records that permission was granted in part by Ouseley J on 17 February 2005, but gives no citation for that ruling.