Springhall, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames

A planning officer exercising delegated powers performs the same decision-making task as the planning committee. The existence of a real issue about the meaning or application of planning policy does not itself require referral to the committee. The officer’s decision remains reviewable for illegality or Wednesbury irrationality.

Courts determine the meanings that planning-policy language can reasonably bear. Choosing among those meanings and applying the policy to the facts are primarily matters of planning judgment. A policy presumption against development is capable of being rebutted. Whether the circumstances rebut it may likewise be a matter of planning judgment.

A planning officer granted permission under delegated powers for the demolition and replacement of a dwelling within a conservation area. The dwelling was designated a building of townscape merit, and local policy created a presumption against its demolition. The appellant, a neighbouring owner who had submitted written objections, sought judicial review.

Richards J dismissed the claim. On appeal, the appellant argued that uncertainty about the application of the policy, or the existence of the presumption itself, required the application to be determined by the Planning Committee. The central issues were the scope of the decision in R (Carlton-Conway) v London Borough of Harrow, the proper limits of delegated planning powers and whether the officer had acted outside the Council’s delegation scheme.

1. Appeal dismissed. Auld LJ held that the officer was entitled to determine the application under delegated powers. Moore-Bick LJ and Sir Peter Gibson agreed.

2. A planning officer’s task is not a separate threshold exercise concerned only with whether referral is required. If authorised under the local scheme, the officer performs the same task as the Planning Committee: deciding whether to grant or refuse permission. The courts may intervene for illegality or Wednesbury irrationality, but there is no special or modified Wednesbury rule governing the officer’s decision to exercise delegated powers.

3. The decision in R (Carlton-Conway) v London Borough of Harrow [2002] EWCA Civ 927 depended on uncertainty about the policies and facts in that case. It did not establish a general rule that every real issue concerning the meaning or application of planning policy must be referred to a committee. To the extent that it suggested such a rule, the court disagreed with it.

4. Courts determine what meanings planning-policy language is reasonably capable of bearing. Within that permissible range, interpretation and application commonly involve planning judgment. The weight given to material considerations is also for the planning decision-maker, subject to irrationality.

5. The local presumption against demolition was not irrebuttable. The policy contemplated demolition where retention and adaptation were not realistically possible and an acceptable replacement was proposed. Whether that condition was met could include economic, environmental and aesthetic considerations and was a matter for the officer’s planning judgment.

6. The officer had considered the presumption, the objections, the condition of the existing building and the proposed replacement. He could rationally conclude that demolition complied with the Development Plan and Supplementary Planning Guidance. The application therefore neither significantly departed from policy nor fell outside the delegated authority.

7. Under section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972, local authorities determine how their planning functions are delegated. Courts should not add restrictions based on complexity, sensitivity, public importance or factual or policy disagreement. The interest in public participation must be considered alongside the efficient and timely administration of planning control.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. The court upheld Richards J’s conclusion that the planning officer had acted within the Council’s delegated powers.

2. Administrative Court: Richards J dismissed the appellant’s claim for judicial review by an order dated 18 January 2005. No neutral citation for that decision is stated in the judgment.