Technoprint Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v Leeds City Council & Anor

Where a planning authority delegates a class of decisions to officers subject to exceptions requiring planning judgment, an officer’s decision to exercise delegated power is reviewed on the same basis as the planning decision itself. The court applies ordinary Wednesbury rationality and does not impose a general threshold rule requiring referral to a planning committee whenever policy or factual issues are arguable. A formal two-stage analysis is usually unnecessary, although an officer may rationally approve development yet act irrationally in deciding that delegated power is available. A planning permission may be quashed where central matters remain unresolved and conditions lack a clear, reasoned appraisal of their legality and intended operation.

The claimants challenged planning permission granted by Leeds City Council for the demolition of a workshop and construction of 12 flats. They alleged procedural unfairness, that the officer lacked authority under the council’s scheme of delegation, and that the grant was irrational or unreasonable.

The court had previously rejected the challenge based on the alleged absence of a valid delegation scheme. This judgment addressed the remaining grounds, including whether the application fell within exceptions to delegated authority and whether permission was unlawfully granted subject to conditions concerning green space and contaminated land.

1. Procedural fairness. The claimants’ emails seeking information about the decision-maker did not amount to representations that the application should be referred to a Plans Panel. They had no right to make such representations, and no legitimate expectation of panel consideration arose. Although accurate answers would have been good administrative practice, their absence did not create a legal obligation whose breach required quashing. In any event, even assuming unfairness, the court would have refused relief because earlier intervention by the councillor would not realistically have altered the decision.
2. Delegated authority. The principles in R (Carlton-Conway) v London Borough of Harrow [2002] EWCA Civ 927 and R (Springhall) v London Borough of Richmond-upon-Thames [2006] EWCA Civ 19 were not in conflict. Where the availability of delegated power depends on planning judgment, the officer’s decision may be challenged for irrationality or unreasonableness. The court adopts the same approach as on a challenge to the planning merits. Usually no formal two-stage appraisal is required, since the relevant considerations overlap. However, an officer may rationally consider that permission should be granted while irrationally concluding that he has authority to grant it.
3. Application. The delegation report treated green space and contamination as main planning issues. It was irrational to grant permission subject to a condition requiring additional or improved green space without a clear appraisal of how the condition could lawfully and practically be fulfilled. It was also unreasonable to grant permission when significant contamination issues remained unknown and unresolved, relying on several conditions instead of obtaining the further information recommended by the council’s technical officer.
4. Disposition. The planning permission dated 7 February 2008 was quashed. Conditions 2 and 14 to 20 inclusive concerned matters central to the decision, so severance was inappropriate. The parties were directed to make written submissions on the form of order and costs.

The judgment records an earlier judgment in the same proceedings, handed down on 9 December 2009, which rejected the challenge based on the alleged absence of a valid scheme of delegation. This judgment determined the remaining grounds.