Zielinski v District Court Legnica

Under sections 11 and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant passage of time in a conviction case is the period since the person became unlawfully at large. A person who deliberately absents himself from trial is primarily the author of the ensuing delay. That delay will ordinarily not make extradition oppressive, although concurrent fault by the requesting state may be considered. Any allegation of such fault requires evidential support. Unexplained delay does not necessarily establish fault, and even culpable state delay will not necessarily make extradition oppressive. The court must assess all the circumstances, including whether the delay created a genuine sense of security.

The claimant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of District Judge Nicholas Evans at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordering his extradition to Poland. He had been convicted in his absence of burglary and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The district judge found that he had deliberately absented himself from the trial and rejected his submission that extradition was barred by the passage of time.

The appeal concerned only whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive under section 14, particularly the effect of delay after the claimant left Poland and the requesting authority’s delay in issuing an arrest warrant.

1. Appeal dismissed. The claimant’s deliberate absence from his trial meant that he was properly regarded as a fugitive from justice and primarily the author of the relevant delay.
2. Under section 14(b) of the Extradition Act 2003, the focus in a conviction case is the period since the claimant became unlawfully at large. The court was nevertheless prepared to assume that earlier delay could receive some limited consideration.
3. Following Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, delay caused by flight, concealment or evasion of arrest will not ordinarily make extradition unjust or oppressive. The principle applies to oppression as well as injustice.
4. Concurrent fault by the requesting authority may be relevant: Goodyer and Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2007] EWHC 2012.Admin. However, an allegation that the authority dragged its feet requires proper evidential support: Falanga v Office of State Prosecutor, Novarra, Italy [2007] EWHC 268 (Admin). Unexplained delay does not necessarily establish fault: La Torre v Italy [2007] EWHC 1370 (Admin).
5. Even culpable state delay does not necessarily make extradition oppressive. It is relevant to consider whether delay created a sense of security, but no such sense of security arose on these facts: Spanovic v Croatia [2007] EWHC 1170 (Admin).
6. Taking all the circumstances into account, the delay was not excessive and was substantially attributable to the claimant’s own conduct. The district judge was correct to reject the section 11 and section 14 challenge. No further order was required.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed. The order for extradition made by District Judge Nicholas Evans at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court was upheld.