Goodyer & Gomes v Government of Trinidad & Tobago

Under section 82 of the Extradition Act 2003, delay caused by an accused’s flight normally cannot support a claim that extradition would be unjust or oppressive. That principle does not require the court to disregard culpable delay by the requesting state where both sides contributed to the passage of time. The decision-maker must assess the overall effect of the delay, including any sense of security arising from the state’s inaction. Evidence of oppressive prison conditions previously experienced may also be relevant to the section 82 assessment. Article 3 compatibility must be determined on up-to-date evidence concerning the conditions in which the person will actually be detained.

These were conjoined appeals under the Extradition Act 2003 by Goodyer and Gomes from decisions of the City of Westminster Magistrates Court. Both appeals concerned whether extradition to Trinidad and Tobago was barred by the passage of time under sections 79(1)(c) and 82, and whether the proposed detention conditions were incompatible with article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights under section 87.

Goodyer had returned to the United Kingdom after being released on bail, while the requesting state accepted that it had delayed culpably in locating his file and seeking extradition. Gomes had left Trinidad after being discharged on some charges, but the status of outstanding charges and the circumstances of his departure required further examination. Both cases also raised evidence concerning detention in Trinidad’s Maximum Security Facility.

1. The appeals were not finally determined in favour of either side. The court directed the magistrates’ court to decide the relevant questions again under sections 79(1)(c), 82 and 87 of the Extradition Act 2003.

2. The principle stated in Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 applies to section 82. Delay caused by the accused’s flight, concealment or evasion ordinarily cannot be relied upon to establish injustice or oppression. However, that principle is not exhaustive where the requesting state has also been culpably inactive.

3. Where both the accused and the requesting state have contributed to the delay, the decision-maker must give such weight as is appropriate to the effects of the passage of time. The requesting state’s responsibility may become material when it was no longer reasonable for it not to have located the accused. The resulting sense of security, together with the accused’s lack of concealment and other consequences of delay, may make extradition oppressive.

   This approach was supported by Osman (No 4) [1992] 1 All ER 579, adopted and amplified in La Torre v Italy [2007] EWHC 1370, and followed in Spanovich v Croatia [2007] EWHC 1770 (Admin).

4. The passage of time is not assessed solely by counting years. In Gomes’s case, the lapse of approximately nine years was a significant factor but did not make extradition oppressive as a matter of law. Evidence of the conditions previously endured in Trinidad custody was admissible as part of the oppression case.

5. For article 3 purposes, the relevant question concerned detention in the Maximum Security Facility identified in the diplomatic assurance. The evidence was capable of founding an article 3 case, but further and up-to-date evidence was required. The matter was therefore remitted for reconsideration by the senior district judge or another nominated judge, with the evidence to be served and exchanged according to the court’s directions.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On appeal from decisions of the City of Westminster Magistrates Court, the cases were remitted for the relevant questions to be decided again under sections 79(1)(c), 82 and 87 of the Extradition Act 2003.