Krzyzowski v Circuit Court In Gliwice, Poland

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate flight from the requesting state to avoid prosecution ordinarily prevents reliance on delay as making extradition unjust or oppressive. The requesting state must prove deliberate flight to the criminal standard because the finding operates as an almost automatic bar, subject only to truly exceptional circumstances. The court followed the ratio in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus and declined to follow a broader approach which treated the fugitive’s conduct and culpable state delay as automatically requiring a balancing exercise. In European arrest warrant cases, mutual recognition and confidence between member states mean that extensive evidence about the requesting state’s abuse-of-process procedures is generally unnecessary.

The Gliwice Circuit Court requested the appellant’s surrender to Poland for prosecution for burglaries allegedly committed between 1998 and 1999. The appellant had left Poland in October 1999 and relied on section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, contending that the passage of time made surrender unjust or oppressive.

The District Judge found, to the criminal standard, that the appellant had deliberately fled Poland knowing of the outstanding matters and to avoid prosecution. He ordered extradition for the burglary offences. The appellant appealed, challenging the burden and standard of proof, the effect of deliberate flight, and the relevance of possible injustice in the Polish proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant had deliberately fled Poland in knowledge of the outstanding matters and to avoid prosecution.
2. Where deliberate flight prevents reliance on delay under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the requesting state must prove that fact beyond reasonable doubt. The finding operates as an almost automatic bar to reliance on delay, subject to the most exceptional circumstances. The criminal standard was consistent with the approach under sections 20(3) and 85(3) of the Act and with Mitoi v Romania.
3. The court followed the ratio of Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Delay caused by the accused’s flight, concealment or evasion cannot ordinarily be relied upon as making extradition unjust or oppressive. The court declined to follow the broader approach in Goodyer and Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago, which treated concurrent culpable delay by the requesting state as requiring the respective faults to be balanced. La Torre v Italy was consistent with the narrower approach because it recognised that an extraditee cannot benefit from delay for which he is responsible.
4. Mr Justice Mitting observed that culpable delay after the requesting state becomes aware of the extraditee’s whereabouts may be relevant, but where the whereabouts remain unknown the mere period before issue of the European arrest warrant does not ordinarily demonstrate culpable delay. The present case was not exceptional.
5. The court expressed reservations about requiring evidence that Polish law would reject an abuse-of-process application. Such a requirement would undermine the simple, quick and effective European arrest warrant procedure and the mutual recognition principle. Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 should be construed consistently with the Council Framework Decision and the confidence required between member states. Questions of injustice or oppression therefore did not arise on these facts.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal from the District Judge’s order for extradition. The District Judge had discharged the appellant in respect of three offences which were not extradition offences, but ordered extradition for the burglary offences.