Statkevicius v Prosecutor General Office Lithuania

Under section 31 of the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court may extend the period for beginning an extradition appeal more than once, including retrospectively after the period has expired. The automatic consequences in section 31(6) arise only if the court does not grant an extension.

In assessing whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of delay under section 14, the court must consider the particular circumstances. There is no fixed time limit. The requested state may rely on the requesting state’s safeguards for ensuring a fair trial, especially where the requesting state is bound by Article 6 of the ECHR. Culpable delay and the development of a sense of security may be relevant, but delay alone does not establish injustice or oppression.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order directing his extradition to Lithuania to face trial for alleged fraud, company mismanagement and accounting offences.

He also sought a declaration under section 31(6), arguing that the statutory period for beginning the appeal had expired and that the appeal was therefore automatically allowed. On the merits, he relied on delay, alleged prejudice to his defence, inconsistencies in the information supplied by Lithuania, family circumstances and the seriousness of the allegations. The central issues were whether a further retrospective extension could be granted and whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive.

1. Section 31 time limit. The application under section 31(6) failed. Sections 31(4) and (5) expressly permit the High Court to extend the relevant period more than once and to exercise that power after the period has expired. The statutory consequences in section 31(6) therefore do not arise automatically and irretrievably upon expiry. The construction adopted in Moulai v Director of Public Prosecutions of Creteil France [2009] EWHC 1031 (Admin) was applicable, and the same conclusion had been reached in relation to the equivalent provision in Wright v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 515 (Admin).
2. Section 14 and delay. The question was whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive, not whether a trial would necessarily be unjust or oppressive. The court had to assess the particular case. There was no fixed cut-off point, and the court had to consider safeguards available in the requesting state to protect against prejudice caused by delay. The Lithuanian courts, being bound by Article 6 of the ECHR, could assess any prejudice and either prevent an unfair trial or provide appropriate protection within the trial process. The approach in Knowles v Government of the United States of America [2007] 1 WLR 47 and Woodcock v Government of New Zealand [2003] EWHC 2668 (Admin) was applied.
3. Oppression. Culpable delay, and any resulting sense of security, could be relevant, but culpable delay did not automatically make extradition unjust or oppressive. The focus was principally on the effect of the passage of time. The approach in Spanovic v The Government of Croatia [2007] EWHC 1770 (Admin) was applied.
4. The missing documents and witnesses, the delay and inaccuracies in the information, and the appellant’s lawful family and private life in the United Kingdom did not establish true oppression. The circumstances were materially less serious than those in Senkus v District Court of Kaunas [2007] EWHC 345 (Admin). The seriousness of the allegations was a permissible factor, although it was not determinative.
5. The appeal was dismissed.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court extradition order was dismissed.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Evans ordered the appellant’s extradition to Lithuania on 31 January 2011.