Senkus v District Court of Kaunas

When deciding whether extradition would be oppressive or unjust because of delay, the court must assess the circumstances as a whole. A technical or apparent breach of bail conditions does not by itself establish that the requested person deliberately became a fugitive or justify extradition. Relevant considerations include the accused’s age at the alleged offence, the length and unexplained nature of the delay, the practical operation of any restrictions, the authorities’ conduct, and the life established during the intervening period.

This was an appeal from the decision of District Judge Evans at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 24 October 2006 ordering the claimant’s extradition to Lithuania. The allegation concerned a rape said to have occurred in Lithuania in March 1996. Proceedings were delayed while a co-accused remained at large. The claimant had later left Lithuania, lived in the United States, returned to Lithuania and then moved to the United Kingdom.

The appeal raised a single issue: whether the passage of time, viewed with the surrounding circumstances, made extradition oppressive and unjust under the Extradition Act 2003.

1. The appeal was allowed. The extradition order was oppressive and should not stand.
2. The court treated the issue as fact-specific. It was necessary to examine the entire chronology, including the claimant’s age when the alleged offence was committed, the substantial period of inactivity, the absence of an apparent explanation for the delay, and the conditions under which he had lived after the proceedings became dormant.
3. Although the claimant may technically have been in breach of the original house-arrest conditions, that fact was insufficient. On the evidence, he had not deliberately made himself a fugitive from justice. He had travelled openly, without concealment, and the authorities appeared to have known of his movements without reporting or acting upon any breach.
4. The practical reality of the arrangement mattered. The purported house arrest had not been effectively enforced, and the proceedings had effectively gone to sleep while the authorities awaited the arrest of the co-accused. The claimant’s conduct therefore could not be assessed solely by reference to the literal terms of the original order.
5. Taking the circumstances together, including the claimant’s settled life in the United Kingdom and the long period following an unpursued allegation, it would not be just to order his return. Extradition would be oppressive within sections 11 and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The President’s judgment was expressly agreed by Mr Justice Lloyd Jones.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal against the extradition order.
• City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Evans ordered extradition on 24 October 2006.