Szklanny v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court & Anor

The power to extend the statutory period for extradition under section 35(4)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003 is broadly framed. It is not limited to cases where surrender was prevented by circumstances beyond the control of the member states. The court must exercise the discretion with regard to the wording and purpose of the European arrest warrant framework, including the objectives of facilitating extradition and promoting mutual co-operation. Circumstances beyond state control will normally justify an extension, but they are not exhaustive. An extension may be granted where the issuing judicial authority makes an urgent request in good faith and the extension is limited so as to encourage prompt surrender.

The claimant challenged the decision of a district judge to extend the time for his extradition to Poland from 23 September to 30 September 2007. His extradition had been ordered under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, and no appeal had been lodged.

The claimant argued that section 35(4)(b) had to be read as permitting an extension only where surrender was prevented by circumstances beyond the control of the member states, reflecting Article 23(3) of the European arrest warrant framework. The central issue was the scope of the court’s discretion under section 35(4)(b).

1. The claim was dismissed. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted, but the substantive challenge failed.
2. Section 35(4)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003 gives the court a broad discretion to agree a later date for surrender. That provision differs from section 35(5), which expressly requires discharge unless reasonable cause is shown for delay. The absence of equivalent limiting language in section 35(4)(b) was significant.
3. The domestic provision must be interpreted, so far as possible, in light of the wording and purpose of the European arrest warrant framework. That interpretative obligation does not require the statutory discretion to be confined exclusively to cases falling within Article 23(3), where surrender is prevented by circumstances beyond the control of the member states.
4. The court should ordinarily exercise the discretion consistently with that circumstance, but the framework’s wider purposes also matter. Those purposes include facilitating extradition, enhancing extradition procedures and encouraging mutual co-operation between judicial authorities. An extension may therefore be appropriate even where it has not been shown that every delay occurred without fault on the part of state agencies.
5. On the facts, the Polish judicial authority could not reasonably have been expected to act before the appeal period expired. The delay in notification was limited, the location of any fault was uncertain, and the extension granted was short. It placed pressure on the relevant authorities to arrange surrender promptly. The district judge’s decision was therefore a lawful and unimpeachable exercise of discretion.

The matter came before the Divisional Court as an application for permission to apply for judicial review, with the substantive hearing to follow if permission was granted. Permission was granted and the substantive claim was dismissed.