Kasprzak v Warsaw Regional Court, Poland

Applications to the High Court for discharge following delay in extradition under Extradition Act 2003, section 36, must fail because discharge is reserved to the designated District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). A request to extend the extradition period under section 36(3)(b) is sui generis and need not be made under CPR Part 23. The period may be extended after the original period has expired. The requested person has no right to be heard on the request, although the court may invite representations where fairness requires and should inform the person of any extension. Expiry of the period does not itself make a subsequent removal unlawful, subject to a successful application for discharge.

Three conjoined applications concerned extradition to category 1 territories under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003. The required periods under section 36 had expired or were approaching expiry, and the High Court had agreed extensions. Kasprzak and Bingham sought orders from the High Court setting aside or effectively displacing those extensions and sought discharge. Wilson-Campbell’s application was withdrawn by consent, with the required period extended. The central issues were the proper forum for discharge, the nature and timing of requests under section 36(3)(b), the procedural rights of the requested person, and the effect of an extension granted after the original period had expired.

1. The applications by Kasprzak and Bingham were dismissed. Under sections 36(8) and 67(1)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003, an application for discharge must be made to the designated District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). The High Court has no power to order discharge at this stage.
2. A request for agreement to a later date under section 36(3)(b) is independent of extant proceedings and has a sui generis character. It is not an application under CPR Part 23, although the court may record its agreement in a formal order.
3. The statute and article 23 of the Framework Decision permit an extension to be requested and agreed after the original required period, or a previously extended period, has expired. The judge expressed strong doubt, without deciding, that a discharge application could be made while the subsequently extended period remained current.
4. The requested person has no entitlement to notice or a hearing on the extension request. The court may invite representations if fairness requires. Fairness and good administration do require the person to be informed of the agreed extension, normally by providing the court’s order.
5. The High Court has no jurisdiction to set aside its agreement to an extension or an order recording it. Judicial review does not lie against a High Court judge acting judicially, and CPR rules 23 and 40.9 provide no independent basis.
6. Kasprzak’s challenge failed. The extension order was unambiguous and was supported by the cancellation of the proposed flight because of adverse weather and the availability of a later flight. Section 36 does not make removal after expiry automatically unlawful, although discharge may be available under section 36(8).

The observations on wider issues were expressly obiter. The required periods for Kasprzak and Bingham were further extended to run for ten days from 2 February 2011.

First-instance decision of the Administrative Court on applications concerning extensions of extradition periods. The judgment states that the applications of Kasprzak and Bingham were dismissed and that Wilson-Campbell’s application was disposed of by consent.