Pierce v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council

A local authority may owe a common-law duty of care to a child in relation to investigating suspected abuse and deciding whether protective action is required. The question whether imposing the duty is fair, just and reasonable depends on the individual circumstances, having regard to the effect of later authority and the Human Rights Act 1998. The standard is that of a reasonably competent social-services department judged by the professional standards prevailing at the relevant time. A failure to carry out a required review or careful assessment may constitute a breach. Causation must nevertheless be proved for the particular damage claimed; hereditary or other independent causes cannot simply be disregarded. Cumulative abuse may be assessed as a whole, but speculative psychiatric, employment and later street-abuse losses are not recoverable without sufficient proof.

The claimant alleged that the defendant local authority negligently failed to protect him from neglect and abuse during his childhood. He had been taken into foster care in 1976, returned to his parents in November 1977, placed on an at-risk register after injuries in 1979, and later experienced periods living away from home before being taken into care.

The claim concerned alleged failures in assessment, monitoring, investigation and intervention. The court considered duty of care, breach during three periods, causation, limitation and damages. The central issues were whether a duty was owed, whether the defendant’s decisions fell below the applicable professional standard, and what damage was proved to have resulted.

1. Duty of care. The reasoning in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, denying a duty in this context, had been considerably undermined by later authority and the Human Rights Act 1998. Following the reasoning adopted in JD & Others v East Berkshire NHS Trust & Others [2003] Lloyds Law Rep Med 552, a duty could be owed to a child where abuse was suspected. Whether its imposition was fair, just and reasonable had to be determined on the facts, applying the approach in Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. The defendant owed the claimant such a duty from at least mid-1976.
2. Standard and breach. The applicable standard was that of a competent local-authority department, assessed against the prevailing professional climate between 1976 and 1991. The defendant had failed to carry out the statutory review due before the claimant’s return to his parents in November 1977. That was not a merely technical breach. There was also no proper assessment justifying the return, and the decision fell below the required standard.
3. The evidence supported a finding that the claimant suffered neglect, indifference and periodic violence after his return home. The cumulative effect of the abuse could be considered when assessing causation, consistently with Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550.
4. The absence of adequate investigation and oversight after the 1979 injuries probably represented a serious failing, but the evidence did not establish that competent action would probably have resulted in care proceedings or removal at that time. The failure to respond actively to the claimant’s absences in 1990 probably fell below the required standard, but no specific additional damage was proved.
5. Causation and damages. The court declined to extend the passage relied on from Simmons v British Steel Plc [2004] ICR 585 so as to avoid proof of causation where hereditary factors made a significant contribution to the claimant’s personality disorder. The recoverable damage was the proved childhood neglect and abuse, including physical violence. Later street abuse and rape, psychiatric deterioration beyond the hereditary element, treatment costs, loss of employment opportunity and labour-market disadvantage were not sufficiently proved.
6. The limitation objection failed. The claimant acquired the necessary knowledge only when he obtained the social-services records in July 2004, so it was unnecessary to consider an extension under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. General damages were assessed at £25,000.

First-instance decision. No earlier judgment in the same proceedings is stated.